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BOOKS

NoMos VI -

REVIEWED

JUSTICE. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal

Philosophy. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich and John W. Chapman.
New York: Atherton Press, 1963. Pp. x, 325. $6.00.
This volume contains fifteen essays of which ten are theoretical and five
historical in approach. The contributors are almost without exception specialists
familiar both with the historical development of the idea of justice and with
the many contemporary works on the subject.
At the head of the series - doubtless so placed in order to point up the
usefulness of a certain amount of specialized knowledge to those who deal with
this topic - is Professor Frank H. Knight's essay "On the Meaning of Justice."
Knight, an economist at the University of Chicago, shows both cultivation and
openness of mind; he appears, however, to be an amateur philosopher, not well
versed in either the classical or the contemporary works devoted to the analysis
of the idea of justice. He bases his entire approach on a fundamental opposition
between the old idea of an authoritarian law, established once for all and fixed
in its primitive state, and the modem idea of a body of law continually developing in the context of a liberal and egalitarian democracy. The authoritarian view of law he equates with a stress on conformity to established usages:
"the scholastic writers were in accord with the facts of the time in holding the notion of an unjust law to be self-contradictory." (p. 2') In their society, what was
not an established usage could be neither law nor justice; what was an established
usage must be both. For Knight, it is only a democratic society that poses the
problem of justice in terms of guiding the development and interpretation of
a changing body of law.
This rather superficial dichotomy, which sets up authoritarian law of divine
origin against democratic law expressive of societal aspirations toward justice, fails
to take account of a basic problem confronting authoritarian law. The problem
arises in the existence of merely human authorities who act as tyrants and who
may create unjust laws (cf. Sophocles' Antigone) or violate the unwritten laws
common to all peoples (cf. Aristotle's Rhetoric I, 13 6 8 b). To be sure, natural law
supernaturally given law - cannot, by definition, be unjust; but for this very
reason it serves as a touchstone of justice to apply to human law. It limits
the arbitrary exercise of power by condemning as unjust those mandates of
human authority that transgress its rules.1 It is not the old authoritarian view
of law but rather the modem school of legal positivism which tends so to identify
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justice with 2conformity to law as to negate all consideration of the problem of
unjust laws.
Knight reduces his entire discussion of justice to the problem of the just law.
This involves him in a curiously contradictory conclusion:
One who wishes to speak or write about justice should be clear and
make it clear to others that he is not dealing with any general and positive ideal, but with the law, either as it is or as it might be if some rather
specific injustice were removed or alleviated. (p. 23)
I am entirely in accord with the motive behind this conclusion, which is to
avoid luxuriating in generalities; but I would very much like to know how
Knight would explain in what "the specific injustice of a particular situation"
consists since he refuses to apply the term just to anything but laws. One wonders
too whether he would be certain to refuse to term unjust a clearly partisan
judicial decision.3
Professor Carl Friedrich's essay "Justice, The Just Political Act" is conceived
on a quite different level. The author limits his analysis to this question:
What particular act or complex of acts and/or events, recurrent in all
politics, what concrete political experience is meant when people speak of
justice and injustice? (p. 25)
He insists that what is involved in this context is not a purely subjective feeling but an objective quality: "Justice expresses a political relation of persons
and things and as such has a function in political situations." (p. 26) He goes
on to define more precisely the nature of this relation:
An action - and hence likewise a rule, a judgment, or a decision - may
be said to be just when it involves a comparative evaluation of the
persons affected by the action and when that comparison accords with
the values and beliefs of the political community. This is the point of
Aristotle's isotes, which is politically relevant and which can be summed
up in the statement that equals should be treated equally. For the alleged
equality can become a standard only when the values and beliefs relevant
to a determination of equality are concretely stated. (pp. 27-28)
Thus, giving special protection to women and children - rescuing them before
men, for example from a burning theater - will seem just to us because it reflects the values of our community. What seems just to us, then, is not absolute
equality, but rather a kind of inequality or partiality which is not arbitrary,
because it is based on the aspirations of the community. In this schema of
2.
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justice any norm which requires the impossible seems arbitrary and can therefore be ruled out as unjust: "ultra posse nemo obligatur."
Elsewhere in his article Friedrich opposes, albeit not by name, the thesis of
Rawls, which identifies the ideal of justice, conceived in political and social terms,
with the absolute equality of all citizens, and allows no deviations from equality
except those which can be justified in terms of common consent, special contribution, or particular necessity. Friedrich finds that one of these three elements,
the consent of the parties involved, does not by any means always assure an
agreement we consider just. Even if all three elements are relevant criteria, it
is not "very satisfactory, however, from a political standpoint, to erect an unreal
standard - absolute numerical equality - as the norm and then to treat all
real situations involving justice as deviations from it." (p. 29) Rawls' theory
does indeed impose a norm of justice which is demonstrably external to the
values and ideals of a political community; this is presumably what Friedrich
means by an "unreal standard." Friedrich, on the other hand, propounds a conception of justice defined by relation to the aspirations of the community, a
communal relativism taking into account the conflicts of value within the
community. This conception leads to the possibility of acts being more or less
just. "The most just act is the act which is compatible with the largest number
of values and beliefs, allowance also being made for their intensity." (p. 31)
It is as a consequence of the existence of value conflicts that the ideas of authority
and of legitimacy take on so much importance (pp. 33-39); they compensate
for the lack of techniques which would create a unanimous consensus in a
dynamic and changing society:
A just act is required to produce the legitimate ruler, whereas the legitimacy of the ruler helps render his actions just by providing them with
an authority which bare or brute power does not possess. (p 37)
To be just, in Friedrich's view, a political decision must not only avoid
the arbitrary and not demand the impossible; it must also not be based on false
data; at least such data must not have been "crucial for arriving at the decision
to act in that way." (p. 38) I assent to this ruling, provided that it does not
exclude the possibility of having recourse to certain juridical fictions which
present a deliberate negation of fact for the sake of a superior administration
of justice. For example, in Belgium in a recent dramatic trial of the persons
guilty of the death of a deformed child, the jury, having pity on the mother
and the doctor involved, judged against all the facts that the accused did not
commit murder, in order to allow the acquittal desired by public opinion.
Friedrich's penetrating analysis, written from the perspective of democratic
political theory, equates the justice of a political act, as we have noted, with
its conformity to community desires and values. It does not concern itself with
the moral worth of these social aspirations, nor does it take up the basic question
of whether there exists some basis other than that of brute force for adjudication,
in the name of justice, of claims involving communities whose aims are totally
incompatible.
Let us suppose (as a hypothesis) that the National-Socialist regime was
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legitimate in the eyes of the German people and that the decisions of its leaders
conformed to the aims and ideals of the majority of Germans; let us also assume
that the institution of the Nuremberg tribunal and its manner of judging the
leaders of defeated Germany were conformable to the aspirations of the Allies.
Must we conclude that it was only brute power rather than principles of universal
application which could lend prevailing strength to one or the other concept
of justice? Or that the quest for ideals and values which will be acceptable to
all mankind - merely because such a quest is not yet politically organized is not the province of the political philosopher? Does an act become politically
just simply by being conformable to the values and norms of a society, values
and norms which themselves evade entirely the strictures of political justice
through the use of the maxim Vox populi, vox Dei?
Can we thus attribute to the principle of majority rule an ultimate value in
which content plays no part? Any voluntarist theory raises important difficulties,
even when the will to which ultimate value is attached is that of God. In another
of the essays in this volume, Professor David Granfield points out some of these
difficulties in the course of an interesting comparison of the doctrines of Thomas
Aquinas and William of Occam ("The Scholastic Dispute on Justice: Aquinas
versus Ockham"). He shows the difficulties which voluntarist theologians such
as Occam, working from a concept of justice as whatever God decides, encounter
when they come to deal with natural law. But these theologians can at least
found their arguments on the perfection and the oneness of God. How much
more justified are Granfield's criticisms when we apply them to a similar
voluntarist conception, but one in which the ultimate will is not that of God,
but that of certain political entities, opposed to one another and obviously fallible?
Must political philosophy give up a role traditional since the time of Plato, and
like a vote-getting politician bow before mass opinion, rather than seek to inform
and purify such opinion, by introducing conceptions more reasonable, more
philosophically capable of inspiring the various human communities?
Although it is unquestionably true, as Professor Arnold Brecht's essay "The
Ultimate Standard of Justice" clearly demonstrates, that the ideas of justice thus
elaborated cannot be scientifically proved and do not form part of the "scientia
transmissibilis" - despite the past and present opinion of many partisans of
natural law - nonetheless there is still no dearth of attempts to give philosophical
form to the ideal of a just society and to work out reasonable criteria for judging
the value of positive law on some basis other than that of its conformity to the
wishes of the majority. At least four of the essays in this volume represent such
efforts: the philosophical analyses by Rawls and Jenkins and the historical expositions of the utilitarians by Bedau and of Marx by Tucker. It is true, I concede,
that there is grave danger of wishing to impose debatable philosophical views by
force. For this reason I would unhesitatingly set aside any recourse to the rule
of a philosopher-king, who would inevitably become a more or less enlightened
despot. The danger justifies the contention, made by Professor Clarence Morris
in his essay on "Law, Justice and the Public Aspirations," that the legislator or
judge in exercising his functions should think of himself as the instrument of
the public, seeking to realize the aspirations of the latter and not his own private
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aspirations. But the role of the philosopher as such is not to work through
legislative or judicial channels or to use political authority to impose his ideas.
He must content himself with setting forth and justifying his ideas, acting through
the nonpolitical medium of philosophical discourse upon the aspirations and
values of his hearers. If, as Morris shows, the role of political authority is to
express in laws and judgments the aspirations of the community which he
represents, the philosopher's role is to be the educator of the same community,
the one who leads it toward a fuller justice and a greater rationality. There is
a philosophical connection between the two roles: if the political justification
of a law or judgment consists in showing its conformity with the aspirations
of the public, the philosopher must judge these aspirations in the light of standards
which he asserts are valid for all reasonable humanity. It is not by chance if the
specific character of all philosophical thought is a self-development in relation
to ideas and aspirations - like the real, the true, and all the values called
absolute - which are acceptable by a universal audience.4 If philosophical efforts
do not furnish a demonstrable knowledge, there is yet no reason to deny all
rationality to philosophical argument and to take from philosophy all moral
and political significance.
Professor McKeon in his scrupulously clear study "Justice and Equality"
stresses that:
The equality of justice was never set forth as an equality of persons and
natural abilities. It was always proportionate equality established between persons and things or circumstances. The basic ratio is between
person and person, and that ratio, which might be established as a ratio
of ability, knowledge, or virtue in the utopian state, is measured in all
actual communities by two interrelated ratios-the ratio of honor, wealth,
or other external assets at the disposition of the community and the ratio
of law, custom, and opinion by which the community is ruled. (p. 53)
As he demonstrates, the different measuring standards invoking equality seem
acceptable when set forth separately, but involve one in almost insurmountable
conflicts when applied simultaneously:
We recognize the claim that equality in the satisfaction of basic needs
is justice, and we raise no question concerning equality under an impartial
rule of law as justice. But the combination of the two in social justice
is new, and the results of the combination are difficult to understand
and difficult to put into action: the rights of the eighteenth century the freedoms of worship, speech, and assembly - required political institutions to protect individual action; the rights of the twentieth century - the freedom from want, fear, and discrimination - require social
education to form new communities of feelings and cooperative action
to achieve new ends. (p. 60)
The two perspectives, liberal and social, are spelled out in mutually hostile
terms, the liberal view demanding protection for individual enterprises, and
4.
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thus allowing free play to existing natural and social inequalities, whereas the
social view summons the state to reduce such inequalities, watching over and
spurring on by all manner of techniques of intervention the equalization of
its citizens and even of all mankind. Such an antinomy raises problems which
cannot be resolved by referring to the sole idea of equality.
McKeon discerns a similar problem of resolution in the domain of constitutional law:
I * . we recognize that equality of participation in common decisions is
justice, and we raise no question concerning equality of man in dignity and
in accomplishment as justice. But the combination of the two seems to involve an obvious contradiction, since the premature participation in decisions may provide no ground for a sense of getting somewhere in the
accomplishment of values. (p. 60)
The equal exercise of political rights - a basic democratic phenomenon cannot be enjoyed unless there is first present in the community one essential
constitutive factor of any democratic regime - a common assent to the concept
of the dignity of the person, which we express by the idea of the rights of man
and of citizen. Without this common belief, the conditions justifying the inauguration of a democratic regime are cruelly lacking.
McKeon says in conclusion that as the antinomies he mentions make rational
agreement on desirable ends impossible, the justice and rationality of political
action can be determined only through a long process of adjustment of ideas
and aspirations:
The function of reason in human actions is not to lay down a master
plan for imposition on all as the common interest, nor is its function
to design a strategy for execution by some to secure private interests.
Justice is the adjustment by rational means of the use of reason to secure
material goods to the use of reason to establish a common treatment of
men in the community. Justice is the adjustment by rational means of
the use of one's own reason in making decisions to the use of common
reason and consensus to analyze truths and to achieve goods. (p. 61)
I find it difficult to oppose such conclusions. But to be fully useful they ought
to be accompanied by some indication of what reason is and what we are to
understand by "the use of reason" and "adjustment by rational means" in the
context of concrete problems of action, choice, and decision.
The object of Professor Feinberg's study "Justice and Personal Desert" is
to show how the aspirations toward justice represented in the idea of personal
desert are linked with the idea of rationality. With this point in mind he takes
up the notion of desert, distinguishing it from such related ideas as "eligibility"
or "entitlement" and showing that it correlates not with formally stipulated
conditions but with conditions which are not specified in either fundamental or
procedural rules:
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If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment he must, necessarily,
be so in virtue of some characteristic or prior activity. It is because no
one can deserve anything unless there is some basis or ostensible occasion
for the desert that judgments of desert carry with them a commitment
to the giving of reasons. (p. 72)
We must not identify the notion of desert with that of social utility. To treat
someone in a particular way for reasons of social utility is in no way the same
as to treat a person as he deserves. We have only to remember all the situations
in which "reasons of State" have led to injustice. Moreover, a utilitarian
standard is too speculative in nature to be a really useful criterion for judging even
ordinary cases. If we are concerned to appraise a student's knowledge of
mathematics, a "math exam" would surely be more useful for the purpose than
a direct appeal to "utility."
One cannot always employ the standard of desert, however, because the
judges' individual assessment of worth would thereby become too influential a
factor in determining cases. It is clearly necessary that formal criteria of desert
be elaborated in order to provide a safeguard against arbitrary judgments and
to eliminate insecurity each time that subjective evaluation of merits risks
producing injustice and conflict. Accordingly,
Desert is always an important consideration in deciding how we are to
treat persons, especially when we are not constrained by rules or where
rules give us some discretion; but it is not the only consideration and is
rarely a sufficient one. (p. 94-95)
To see the proper limitations of the idea of desert one should contrast it with
the idea of "entitlement." Entitlement emanates from the law and its regulations; on the contrary,
desert is a moral concept in the sense that it is logically prior to and
independent of public institutions and their rules, not in the sense that
it is an instrument of an ethereal "moral" counterpart of our public
institutions. (p. 97)
Professor Rawls, whose conception of justice as "fairness" has been developed
in several remarkable studies, is represented here by an essay "Constitutional
Liberty and the Concept of Justice." He applies a conception of justice as
reciprocity to the determination of what constitutes a just constitution and
deduces in this way the principle of freedom of conscience:
When applied to an institution (or a system of institutions), justice requires the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment
within its structure of a proper balance or equilibrium between competing claims. (p. 99) An institution is just or fair, then, when it satisfies the principle which those who participate in it could propose to
one another for mutual acceptance in an original position of equal liberty.
(p. 103)

CH. PERELMAN
What then are the standards governing the establishment of just institutions
of this kind? For Rawls there are two principles:
• . . first, each person participating in an institution or affected by it has
an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty
for all; and, second, inequalities as defined by the institutional structure
or fostered by it are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they
will work out to everyone's advantage and provided that the positions
and offices to which they attach or from which they may be gained are
open to all. (p. 100)
It follows that no departure from complete equality in the enjoyment of liberty
can be accepted without some definite justification. On the other hand, any such
departure can be accepted if, by meeting the conditions of general advantage
and equal access, it can be shown to be not arbitrary and therefore not unjust.
As Rawls points out, it is not enough to prove that the constitution as
structured will realize the maximum of social utility, because the demands of
justice will not thereby be satisfied:
The concept of justice is distinct from that of social utility in that
justice takes the plurality of persons as fundamental, whereas the notion
of social utility does not. This latter seeks to maximize some one thing,
it being indifferent in which way it is shared among persons except insofar as it affects this one thing itself. (p. 124)
Rawls' hypothesis, as he indicates (p. 100, note 1), recalls the idea of the
social contract. He recognizes, however, that the institutions under consideration need not be newly formed as the social contract theory presupposes; since
they are already effectively functioning when we come to consider them, the
only reasonable approach is to see if there is room to modify them in order
to respond to the legitimate complaints of interested persons. With this end in
mind, he formulates three rules for considering such complaints:
It is understood (1) that, if the principles one proposes are accepted,
the complaints of others will be similarly tried; (2) that no one's complaints will be heard until everyone is roughly of one mind as to how
complaints are to be judged; and (3) that the principles proposed and
acknowledged on any one occasion are binding, failing special circumstances, on all future occasions. (p. 104)
All the foregoing conditions seem acceptable and might even be followed
to the letter if we were dealing with nothing more than a game, with rules
set up to provide equal chances to all players. Actually in such an artificial
situation there is no need to take account of the past, since the institution of
the game rules constitutes an absolute beginning; similarly one can anticipate
the future, predict all the possible results of the game and the conditions in
which they will develop. But we have nothing of the sort confronting us when
we deal with political institutions.
Let us suppose that our ancestors drew up a contract of the type proposed
and agreed on a group of ground rules and rules of procedure. To what extent
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are we bound by their provisions, by the precedents they established and the
situations to which such precedents gave rise? Have we the right to call in
question anew the institutions which they set up and their methods of revision?
Can we escape the burden of the past, by force if necessary, in order to fashion
a new social contract more just than the old one, more responsive to our convictions and aspirations? If at times it becomes necessary to resort to such
violence and revolution to effect a change in institutions, this is because all
those whose interests are affected will not always be unanimous in agreeing to
adopt the changes recommended by some. And who would claim that justice
is always on the side of either traditionalists or reformers? Each side will ordinarily be able to advance arguments for its viewpoint. Although the force of
such arguments may incline us to favor one or the other faction, we could not
justify our judgment without having recourse to criteria which in their turn
can be questioned: practical judgment never leads to self-evident or demonstrable
conclusions.
How far, then, should we conform to tradition, and to what extent depart
from it for the sake of a better administration of justice? Even a cursory
examination of the theory of American case law in areas where it is not affected
by legislation reveals how delicate is the adjustment between the burden of the
past and the pressures of the present. 5 For example, in order to assure an equal
start for all citizens, as Rawls would wish, must we abolish the right of inheritance? Would we perhaps not have to limit or even abolish a man's right
to dispose of his property during his lifetime if we propose to bestow on the
coming generations a perfect freedom from the burdens of the past? But if
we take account of the disadvantages in assimilating the functioning of political
institutions to the rules of a game, because of the extreme instability thereby introduced, if we decide to take the past into consideration in some measure in
the evaluations of social inequalities, then the question of what is just or unjust
in the functioning of institutions will be decided by compromise, by adjustment
to the needs and aspirations of the community.
Looked at in another way, the consensual system Rawls sets up depends
on rules which all those participating in the functioning of the institutions will
regard as just, and therefore acceptable, and which will be predictable in their
practical consequences. Such a system fails to take sufficient note of the disillusionment which experience is apt to bring. In pursuing this point, we can
profitably consider a distinction between two sorts of consent offered by Professor Charles Fried in his essay "Justice and Liberty." One kind of consent, which
Fried calls "first order consensual practice," is found in cases where a man's
rights and duties arise from express undertakings he has entered into - undertakings of whose scope he is fully aware, and which he must keep on the principle
"pacta sunt servanda." The other sort of consent, which Fried calls "second order
practice," is that consensus which exists in a community with regard to the functioning of its institutions, such as the criminal law, or the draft, "where it is the
practice itself which defines the sacrifices to be made." As Fried shows, if we
5.
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envisage the justice of institutions on the model of contractual justice, we are
using a type of "first order practice" to characterize what are actually "second
order practices."
Fried goes on to make another point that can profitably be set against Rawls'
system. Given the lack of consensus among the members of a community concerning fundamental questions on what we might call "questions of conscience"
- can we characterize as just such institutions as compulsory education within
a particular religious or ideological framework, even if they raise no question
of unequal distribution? Can the founders past or present of such institutions
argue that they alone know what is the true good of the community and of each
of its members? In approaching this problem, Fried points out the possibility
of an antinomy between rationality and liberty, and states his preference for
liberty:
But, if these conditions of rationality, and particularly the condition
of knowing one's own interest, were taken at full value as necessary
conditions of a situation of justice, it would be otiose to add, as I think
we must, a notion of liberty as being one of several interests which individuals do in fact have. Furthermore, these conditions would render
the concept of justice inapplicable in many important situations, for in
many situations precisely what is claimed is that the "victim" does not
know his own interests and hence is not rational. If we were to exclude
situations where such claims could be made, the applicability of the concept would be drastically reduced. That is why justice must include the
liberty to define - even incorrectly - one's own interests. (p. 145)
It is because we have imperfect knowledge, because the institutions which
we create can have unforeseen and even unforseeable consequences, that, as Professor John Chapman points out in his essay "Justice and Fairness," the idea of
"fairness," as Rawls conceives it, cannot afford an adequate definition of justice.
For justice must concern itself equally with the needs of men and with the
efficacy of concrete functioning institutions in actually meeting those needs.
Here, according to Chapman, the doctrines of the utilitarians are superior to
those of such men as Locke, who also focus on the "fair" functioning of institutions:
When I say that Locke appears to have been concerned with what we
should call fairness, I mean simply that he thought that, if the competition for wealth was conducted fairly, there was nothing more to be said
on the matter. The outcome of the competition could not be challenged
on the ground of justice. It is the way in which the competition is carried on, not its results, that counts for Locke. This concern with the process of competition is most aptly described, in my opinion, as a concern
for fairness, and it avoids or evades recognition of the claims of need.
It is these claims which are recognized by utilitarianism.
Historically, I think utilitarianism is best viewed as ambiguous with
respect to contractualism. On the one hand, there is a loss of grasp on
the principles of the plurality and moral autonomy of persons; on the
other, there is an advance on contractualist thought, whether this advance be interpreted as an enlargement of the meaning and scope of
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justice or as a shift in meaning from justice as fairness to justice as
equality. On either interpretation, justice is seen as something more than
reciprocity and fair play, and this something more involves recognition
of the claims of need. (p. 153)
We can apply the idea of justice in a procedural sense to those institutional
forms and processes whereby human relationships are governed; we can also
apply it in a substantive sense to a state of affairs, a distribution of goods, a
particular treatment. The considerations applicable to the substantive state of
affairs become more important as procedural devices become attenuated in the
course of time, as inequalities spring up out of the functioning of institutions,
as the results of a given process of decision become less and less foreseeable, as
the consent that validates the institutions becomes more and more a fiction.
Therefore, we cannot limit our concern with the role of justice in the life of
political institutions to the critical assessment of the rules for their functioning;
we must also consider the justice of end results in the light of a sought individual
and social ideal.

Professor Iredell Jenkins' contribution, "Justice as Ideal and Ideology," is
of special interest because it challenges the basic orientation with which most
contemporary writers approach the problems of legal and political philosophy.
This orientation is characterized by a mistrust of metaphysical or utopian constructs, and a tendency to look for the positive content of justice in the aspirations of a community, the individual's sense of justice, "fair" rules of procedure,
or a combination of these. This way of proceeding is noted by Jenkins in
special reference to the essay by Morris, but the same orientation is to be found
in the contributions of Knight, Friedrich, McKeon, and Rawls. Here is Jenkins'
statement of the grounds of his objection to theories of this kind:
In their very natures they leave unsettled what must always be the central
issue, namely, the final values on which the society is grounded, the
ideal ends it seeks to promote, the conditions it means to realize. To the
extent that this issue is left vague and tentative, the entire quest for
justice is unguided. As we have seen, the sense of justice speaks unequivocally and compellingly in particular cases; but its disclosures are
neither generalized nor systematic, so they cannot offer the coherent
direction that purposive action requires. In a word, the sense of justice
is largely retrospective and corrective; the deficiencies it identifies can
be finally repaired only by a body of doctrine that is prospective and
creative. The procedural or operational approach suffers in a similar
way; it must necessarily accept from elsewhere the substance, or contents, of justice, that is, the values that it is to recognize and the conditions that it seeks to further. Procedural justice is concerned with developing an apparatus that will serve as a fair and impartial means to
the attainment of ends that it does not itself determine. (p. 197)
But the solutions that have been offered to this fundamental problem of how
to determine the ends of a society, and what the law must be if it is to implement
these ends, have been subject, Jenkins tells us, to two mutually opposed criticisms:
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the ideals thus proposed have been considered either too debatable to be given
general scope or too vague to be given concrete effect. He notes that these
objections have both been made on genuine grounds; we can meet them only
if we situate our proposed ideals within a framework in which "ideal" and
"ideology" are carefully distinguished. The ideal of justice, conceived as the
"fundamental constitutive idea of social organization and the ultimate regulative
idea of legal and political action" (p. 195) should serve merely to provide a
basic theoretical outline, an outline which the different ideologies of justice
should fill in, each in its own way.6
According to Jenkins, "law must shape aspirations, not merely actualize
them." (p. 199) Such aspirations may indeed be unjust if we define justice in
terms of "fairness, equity, concern, interest, and altruism." (p. 199) If legal
philosophy is to fulfill its function, "sooner or later, implicitly or explicitly, the
concept of justice must be given an intrinsic meaning and an objective reference
that can control the private intuitions and the public procedures of men."
(p. 200)
In working out the answer to this fundamental problem, Jenkins uses a
"genetic and functional approach." (p. 205) Law has a task to perform. What
is it? It is the realization of a certain kind of working order:
The concept of order embodies pure discovery of pattern and regularity,
of stability and continuity, in our surroundings. It refers to the web of
relations that we find connecting discrete objects and occurrences. Order
indicates similarities among things and uniformities of sequence among
events. To say that "order holds" is to say that we are in the presence
of distinct entities that follow established courses and hang together as
a whole, so as to compose a systematic structure. .

.

. I think it is ap-

parent that the concept of order entails reference to four basic elements: a
plurality of distinct entities that exhibit stable group characteristics; the
organization of these into a series of higher-order entities; activities engaged in by these entities and energy exchanged among them; and all
of this taking place in a regular and coherent manner. I shall identify
these items respectively as "the many," "the one," "process," and "pattern

. . .

" (p. 204-205)

As soon as we begin to think of law as the principle of a just order, we will
have to treat it as at once descriptive and prescriptive:
In the human context, order appears as a goal as well as a fact; it is
something to be created as much as something given. .

.

. law is a prin-

ciple that not merely reflects an order that it inherits, but must also define
and guarantee an order that could not exist without it. (p. 206)
Jenkins goes on to give us four objectives which a just order should realize.
They correspond to the four basic elements he regards as inhering in the general
notion of order:
1) With respect to individuals ("the many"), the objective should be "cul6.

Cf. Iredell Jenkins, The Matrix of Positive Law, 6 NATURAL LAW FoRum 1-50 (1961).
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tivation." "Cultivation must pass on a tradition and produce a coherent population while preserving the integrity of individuals." (p. 215) It must work against
both indifferentism and indoctrination.
2) As regards the unity of the system ("the one"), the objective should be
to create and maintain an authority that is at once effective, limited, and legitimate.
3) As regards the forms of interaction ("process"), with the concomitant
notion of responsibility, the objective should be to draw the line between what
is permitted and what is not; this line must be worked out in terms of a body
of rights and duties.
4) To maintain the social milieu in which individuals act ("pattern"), the
objective should be to preserve a certain continuity: "The task of continuity
is to both respect and integrate the separated careers of men, preventing alike
their isolation from and their submergence in the total group enterprise." (p. 216)
What are we to think of this prospectus which Jenkins offers for the work
of legal philosophy? Does his schema escape, as it is intended to, the double
reproach of being arbitrary and vague?
I think it is quite clear that the political philosopher must try to envision
of the ideal society which men concerned in political affairs should be
model
a
working to realize. But in doing this, is the philosopher seeking to realize
within the society only justice, or is he seeking to realize all the qualities he
thinks an ideal society should have? A political order should be not only just,
but efficient and stable as well - it is not without reason that legal philosophers
have seen as the goal of law not only justice but also security and the common
good. It is worth noting that Rawls adopts as his thesis a limited conception
of justice:
Justice is but one of many virtues of political and social institutions,
for an institution may be antiquated, inefficient, degrading, or any number of other things without being unjust. (p. 98)
For Jenkins, on the other hand, the place of justice among the ideals of a
society is in no way specific:
It makes little difference whether the covering name for these [the goals
and the program of a society] is justice, the public interest, the general
welfare, the common good, progress, democracy, communism, or the historic nexus. (pp. 202-203)
The trouble with such an approach as this is that in developing a general
social ideal one is led to lose sight of the specific qualities associated with the
idea of justice. Jenkins, for instance, does not treat at all the ideas of regularity,
equality, proportion, and reciprocity which go to make up the element of rationality traditionally included in the concept of justice. It is significant that
in the present volume objections similar to the foregoing are leveled against
the utilitarians by Bedau (p. 289) and against Marx by Tucker (p. 318). If
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the application of a human or social ideal within a system of law requires a
global vision of man and society, it would seem wise not to present such a
vision under the sole aegis of the idea of justice - unless we are to identify the
thirst for justice with the quest for the Absolute Good.
Furthermore, I question whether the four elements which Jenkins isolates
can serve as useful criteria for the elaboration of an ideal of human society.
To be sure, they show the usefulness of drawing attention to certain elements
which must be taken into account in elaborating an ideology. But these elements are subject to various interpretations, and in practice they have antinomical
tendencies. How far should we limit the rights of the individual, how far the
power of the authorities? How far can authority limit the autonomy of individual wills in their power to create obligations by mutual consent? To what
extent can we constrain individuals in order to educate them? In what measure
is it allowable for those in authority to work against societal traditions or individual values? It seems to me that the answers to such questions should be
sought in debates and suggestions, but not imposed in the form of legal decrees
except insofar as they conform to the aspirations of the bulk of the community.
It may be the role of the philosopher to influence these aspirations, but the
role of the modern legislator is limited to giving them effect.

The remaining essays in this volume are historical in nature. That of David
Granfield, on the opposition between Thomas Aquinas and William of Occam,
shows how effectively theological controversies can illuminate philosophical
debates; the theological antithesis in this case relates to the two conceptions
of law as justice and as commandment. (p. 230)
Locke's conception of justice is analyzed by Professor Cox in his "Justice
as the Basis of Political Order in Locke" and by Professor Polin in his "Justice
in Locke's Philosophy." The two presentations are widely divergent, because
Cox deals only with those passages in Locke in which the word "justice" is
specifically mentioned, whereas Polin takes note of anything which Locke might
have considered relevant to natural law.
The very useful studies of Bedau (Justice and Classical Utilitarianism) and
Robert Tucker (Marx and Distributive Justice) respectively examine the conceptions of justice held by the various utilitarians, and demonstrate the relatively
subordinate position occupied by the idea of distributive justice in the thought
of Marx.
This collection of essays, remarkable for its general level of competence and
analytical penetration, as well as for its richness and diversity, provides a signal
contribution to the analysis of the idea of justice - an idea difficult to grasp
and formulate, but central nonetheless to moral, legal, and political philosophy.
CH. PERELMAN
Translated by JEANNE C.
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The ever-widening stream of books on African politics is in the four volumes
here under review enlarged by four more rivulets from various directions. They
share with many other such contributions, especially when produced by anthropologists, as seem to be the last two, a laudable but somewhat confusing attention
to local details, reminiscent of the proverbial potsherds. They thus sadly contrast with such a volume as Five African States (ed. G. M. Carter), which rests
upon a reasonably sophisticated theoretical approach. With the possible exception of Ezera, who at least cites some of the leading literature, these works
are uninformed of any such elementary theory as that of a "constitution" or
"constitutionalism" or of "power" or of "authority." The first of these key
terms seems to stand as a synonym for any kind of political order; in Winans'
study it is not even possible to discover what the constitution is.
To the student of natural law and legal philosophy, it is depressing that not
even so standard a work as Hoebel's The Law of Primitive Man has evidently
been consulted by these inquirers into the basic law of communities which,
while not primitive, certainly are close to those informal legal systems which
Hoebel so painstakingly and illuminatingly investigated. Nor has there been
exploration to any extent of the questions which Hoebel formulated and sought
to answer.
This much having been said to indicate the political and juristic weakness
of the theory underlying these studies, it remains to discuss their relative strength.

Professor Ezera's sketch of the Nigerian constitutional evolution, after tracing
the colonial background, is primarily concerned with the period from 1946 to
1956, which saw constitution-making attempts in 1946, 1951, and 1954. It serves
to demonstrate the instability of all such attempts to formalize governmental
relations in terms of a constitution which rests upon a tradition of values and
beliefs quite alien to the Nigerian context. A public unformed by centuries
of wrestling with the convictional and philosophical problems, highlighted by
Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius, Althusius, Locke, Montesquieu and others, is not
likely to produce the constituent group for a sound constitutional framework.
Ezera's account of what he calls "tribal nationalism" (though it might more
properly be called tribalism) reveals by the vivid portrayal of a surface phenomenon how deep is the chasm which divides the public of these communities
from the West. When the Weimar Constitution spoke in its preamble of "Germany, united in its tribes" it surely referred to a situation very different from
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that confronting the builders of a viable political order in Nigeria. That impression is reinforced by a perusal of the study by Dr. Odumosu, a lawyer and lecturer
on law. It is based on his doctoral dissertation at London, and is adorned by
the paraphernalia of legal learning, including a series of cases, and a useful
appendix containing the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria. It culminates
in an analysis of the emergency situation including the act of 1961 under which
the government has been seeking to cope with the crisis (again we find no
reference to the extended writings on constitutional dictatorship and emergency
power, such as those of Rossiter and Watkins). The discussion conveys the
eerie impression of a big battle of shadowboxing; there is no penetration to
the heart of the matter: the absence of any really living constitution in Nigeria.
Taylor, a missionary and educator in the land with which he deals, displays
a loving appreciation of the distinctive features of Tanganyika as a living community. Many at one time would have agreed with his optimistic estimate,
formulated before independence was achieved. Recent events, however, have
put a more somber note into this wide-felt hope for Tanganyika's paradigmatic
role. Wracked by tribal conflict, infiltrated by Communist agents, and perplexed
by economic difficulties, Tanganyika has seen its first bloody revolt. In spite
of Nyerere's inspired leadership, political order appears to be a remote prospect
rather than an impending reality. Taylor's careful account of the background
and setting of the present involved situation is a good guide, even though lacking
a sound basis in political theory for penetrating judgment.
Dr. Winans' study provides a more detailed supplement to Taylor's general
portrayal. The term "state" employed in the title is somewhat misleading, since
we are dealing with a subdivision of Tanganyika, and a curiously unstatelike
subdivision at that. This is true even in the author's own antiquated terminology.
For the ruler at the center does not claim a "monopoly upon the exercise of
legitimate force" (Jellinek's and Weber's out-of-date "definition" of a state)
but manipulates the "lineage segments in the elite clan" so as to balance them
against each other - actually a phenomenon familiar enough from Europe's
monarchical past, though not usually described in these clumsy "scientific" terms.
As Taylor describes the Shambala structure it would seem to be tribal rule of
the king-priest type, a system of rule antedating anything that can properly
be described as a state. 1 It is curious that the concept of tradition, although apparently central to the author's analysis, nowhere receives any clarification or is
even located by bibliographical hints in spite of the extended controversies surrounding it. As far as this reviewer can make out, tradition is confounded with
myths, especially the foundation myth of Mbega which is called a tradition. A
political tradition, as I have pointed out, 2 more specifically concerns the political
community, its values and beliefs, including the conduct of men as political
persons. Political tradition defines how rule is conducted. It would seem that
Winans agrees, though he overstresses myth and underrates behavior (cf. pp.
79ff.). With this caveat one can praise Winans' effort to disentangle this

1.

See ch. 10
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His GOVERNMENT 37-52.
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particular "segmentary lineage system" along lines made familiar by M. G.
3
Smith's study.
In conclusion, it may bear repeating that the cumulative impact of these
African studies would have been greatly increased if their authors had familiarized
themselves with political and legal theory, ceased treating certain works like that
of Fortes4 as sources for such theory, and essayed to formulate conclusions which
would relate their findings to the general corpus of political and legal science.
CARL
3.
4.
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CONSTITUTIONAL

Ghana was the first of the Black African colonies to achieve independence,
in 1957. It was the first of the former British colonies to adopt a republican
constitution, in 1960. The organization of its independence movement, the
Convention Peoples Party, was widely copied, and the constitutional experiment
that Ghana launched in 1960 has also been of considerable influence, at least
in the English-speaking African states. Both the politics of independence and
the building of new institutions have been discussed extensively by scholars who,
with a notable exception,1 have paid much less attention to the work of "fleshing
out" the body of laws, an effort in which Ghana of necessity also took the
chronological lead. The new conditions of independence naturally called for
the new-modelling or remodelling of not only constitutional law, but also other
law from the customary "bush roots" on up to supreme court and parliamentary
procedure. This task of fleshing out the new constitutional framework was taken
in hand very deliberately in Ghana, largely under the direction of its controversial sometime Attorney General, Mr. Geoffrey Bing, Q.C. (who is not mentioned in the book under review).
Bennion addresses himself principally to the outcome of this process of putting
meat on the constitutional skeleton, in full awareness of the fact that "the law
is still in flux." (p. vii) In his Preface, he writes:
The introduction of the Republic in 1960 made necessary a complete recasting
of the law of Ghana, with consequent difficulty for those who had to teach,
learn and administer it. To help in this situation I set out to explain some
of the new laws I had helped to prepare. 2 I am not qualified to comment
1. L. RUBIN and P. MURRAY, THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF GHANA (London,
1961). Two of Bennion's footnotes, on minor points, refer critically to this work.
2. Bennion is an English barrister and sometime lecturer and tutor in law at St. Edward's
Hall, Oxford, who was from 1959 to 1961 Technical Adviser to the Government of Ghana
on the preparation of legislation.
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on the political background, nor would it be right for me to do so. My aim
has been to expound the provisions of the law as they exist, and to supply
some technical help for practitioners, teachers and students who may feel
themselves overwhelmed by the recent spate of legislation. (italics supplied)
The book achieves this aim. It even seems to go beyond it on occasions when
the learned author may be trying to influence the interpretation of statutes by
revealing legislative intent on his authority as legislative draftsman. (e.g., p. 452)
His book will probably be most helpful to politicians, administrators, and members of the bar and bench of Ghana. The length of the Table of Cases (more
than 125 are cited) and of the Table of Statutes and Statutory Instruments
(20 pages) may serve as one index of its usefulness.
Does Bennion's book contribute answers to more general questions about
lawmaking in relation to basic human needs in the new states? Despite the
author's cited disclaimer, this query almost asks itself at a time when we read
of the fifth reported attempt on the life of President Nkrumah, his setting aside
of a Special Court's verdict in a treason case, his dismissal of the Chief Justice
and that respected jurist's subsequent resignation from the Supreme Court, and
of the constitutional referendum to confirm the one-party system in the fourth
year of the Republic.
One might expect answers to such questions as the following: Were the
President's actions "constitutional," and in what sense of the word? How does
the republican constitution compare with others elsewhere? What does this
Constitution, and the use to which it has been put so far, tell us about future
constitutional trends, in Ghana and elsewhere in Black Africa? The expectation
of direct answers to these questions would be disappointed, but careful reading
of the book does yield a perspective from which to pursue the inquiry - a
perspective different from but complementary to that provided by the efforts
of political scientists like David E. Apter in his Ghana In Transition.
Bennion traces, for example, the process, begun in the nineteenth century,
of mutual reconciliation and adaptation between customary law and the common law. As this process was conducted from the British side, it involved the
introduction of natural law notions. In the Fanti Bond of 1844,
the chiefs acknowledged the power and jurisdiction which had been de facto
exercised in their territories adjacent to the British forts and settlements, and
declared that "the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and
of property" and that human sacrifices, panyarring or the kidnapping of
hostages for debt, and other barbarous customs "are abominations and
contrary to law." They agreed that serious crimes should be tried by the
Queen's judicial officers sitting with the chiefs, "moulding the customs of
the country to the general principles of British law." (p. 8)
These barbarous customs were outlawed early "on the ground of repugnancy
to natural justice, equity and good conscience." (p. 410) In a manner not
atypical of common law practice, no clear dividing line between "natural justice"
and the "general principles of British law" was ever drawn. As elsewhere in
the common law world, judicial interpretation played an important role in the
process of blending the various notions of justice and legality. In the case of
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the Gold Coast, a high proportion of appealed cases was decided by the West
African Court of Appeal. (p. 449) From the establishment of the first Legislative Council, Royal Instructions issued to the Governor set forth that Ordinances
"were to be drawn up 'in a simple and compendious form, avoiding, as far as
may be, all prolixity and tautology,'" (p. 10) a demand for economy and
elegance of language which could perhaps be derived from natural law.
Some provisions of the Constitution of 1960 apparently put an end to certain
strands in this relatively old natural law tradition. Article 39 of the draft constitution published on March 7, 1960, before the referendum, "included in the
laws of Ghana 'indigenous laws and customs not being repugnant to natural
justice, equity and good conscience, insofar as their application is not inconsistent with any enactment for the time being in force.' " But this definition
was found to be "unwise" by the time of publication of the Constitution Bill
and, therefore, omitted from the Constitution. (p. 404) Again, though Article
42 of the Constitution, on "Jurisdiction," seems less one-sided on this than
Bennion's gloss, he asserts that the Constitution was not meant to be subject to
judicial interpretation:
It is drafted on the assumption that the words used have a fixed and
definite meaning and not a shifting or uncertain meaning; that they mean
what they say and not what people would like them to mean; and that if
they prove unsuitable they will be altered formally by Parliament and not
twisted into new meanings by "interpretation." (p. 111)
However, there are other countervailing provisions in both Constitution and
recent statute law which could be looked upon as continuations or even reinvigorations of the natural law traditions, both British and customary. For
instance, such a meaning could be read into the wording of the presidential oath
(". . . that I will do right to all manner of people according to law without
fear or favour, affection or ill-will. So help me God." Article 12) and the
presidential declaration of fundamental principles (". . That freedom and
justice should be honoured and maintained. . . . That every citizen of Ghana
should receive his fair share of the produce yielded by the development of the
country. . . ." Article 13).
The use of oaths, according to Rattray's Ashanti Law and Constitution, has
precolonial roots, not only for purposes of defining relations between a tribe and
its chief, but also in trying suits between individuals. The latter practice has
been preserved in the Local Courts Procedure Regulations, 1959: the oaths
which are lawful for this purpose are limited by the Regulations to
the state or local oath or oaths recognized in each state (as distinct from
fetish or religious oaths) in use in the area of jurisdiction of the respective
local courts. (p. 433)
As this passage suggests, harmful or criminal fetish worship is still subject to
heavy penalties, under an Ordinance originally made in 1892. (p. 235)
According to the Standing Orders of the National Assembly, members'
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speeches must not contain "blasphemous" words. (p. 314) Sittings of the National
Assembly open with prayers, read by the Clerk and "specially composed for
the Republican Parliament," which are addressed to "Almighty God" and sound
rather Christian. (p. 312)
As others, including this reviewer elsewhere, 3 have observed, the Constitution
of 1960 apparently succeeded in blending pragmatically those Western and
African institutions and procedures which seemed most useful to President
Nkrumah and his constitutional advisers. This blending also involved a good
deal of imaginative innovation. The Constituent Assembly and Plebiscite Bill
of February 23, 1960, authorized the National Assembly ". . . to resolve itself
from time to time into a Constituent Assembly ... " Bennion believes this to be
unique:
Although ad hoc Constituent Assemblies are commonly set up to make new
constitutions and frequently, as in the case of India and Pakistan, to exercise
the functions of an ordinary legislature at the same time, no previous example
was known to the Ghana Government of an existing legislature being given
this double personality. (p. 82)
More interesting than this is the continuation of this same Parliament, to which
ten women members were added, after the plebiscite which overwhelmingly
approved of the new Constitution and elected Kwame Nkrumah as President of
Ghana.
This is not the place for an evaluation of the republican constitution, of
which Bennion gives a detailed elucidation. His evaluation agrees with that of
the Times (London), which he quotes as expressing the view that "It is an
ingenious constitution, avowedly aimed at efficient government during the early
stages of development and expertly framed to suit Ghanaian conditions." (p. 86)
The book is particularly useful in explaining the powers of the president in
relation to the other constitutional organs, and the special powers conferred by
Article 55 upon the first president. Bennion shows, for instance, that,
Following a suggestion made by Government backbenchers, the position
of the Chief Justice was altered to enable him to be dismissed at will from
his office of Chief Justice, though not from his judgeship. (p. 92)
The author thereby provides at least a "strict constructionist" answer to the
question about the propriety of the dismissal of Sir Arku Korsah. In Chapter 5,
"Liberty and State Security," he performs a similar service with respect to the
various civil liberties, remedies against the state, and emergency powers.
The overall impression that emerges is one of considerable, perhaps surprising,
continuity not only between the republican constitution and its predecessors,
but also between the evolving contemporary system of laws and its British colonial forerunner. This is still above all a common law system. Comparison would
probably show that legal and parliamentary procedure in Ghana and, say,
Guinea, shares less in common than in Ghana and Tanganyika or, as for that
3.
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matter, England. Ghana had one advantage over Tanganyika and other East
African territories in the availability, at the time of independence, of a relatively
high number-about two hundred- of trained lawyers. Even throughout the
troubles of the last few years, the underlying commitment to observance of
proper procedures, which generally characterizes the common law world, could
be detected in Ghana. To this interpretation the objection has been raised that
it does the victims little good if preventive detention acts, emergency powers acts,
and the statutes setting up special tribunals to try them were indeed products
of proper constitutional procedures. This objection overlooks a crucial difference:
Even when it is accused of violating the rights of its citizens, the government of
Ghana has sought to justify its actions in terms of the framework of constitutional procedures and its own determination to preserve this framework. Governments of certain other new states, ex-colonies of continental European powers,
have sought to justify their parallel actions in terms of their single-minded
dedication to pursuit of some substantive goal, like economic development or
antineocolonialism. 4 It is Ghana's apparent continuing procedural rather than
substantive commitment that warrants optimism about the future evolution of
its constitution. 5 Bennion's Constitutional Law of Ghana bears detailed and
informed witness to this procedural commitment, at least for the period with
which it deals.
At the same time, the book also corroborates its author's assertion, in his
Preface, that "the law is still in flux." It is very much in flux, not only in Ghana,
but elsewhere in the new states of Black Africa. Because of their understandable
preoccupation with pressing immediate problems, the leaders of these new states
simply have not had the time to address themselves to the more fundamental
and theoretical problems of constitutional and legal development over the longer
run. But even in this realm one can discern the shape of certain distinctively
African features of things to come, which may ultimately receive recognition as
creative contributions to the growing corpus of global legal theory. These contributions can be expected to have deep roots in the precolonial past. British
colonial administration showed an early awareness of both the distinctiveness
and the potential beneficence of some of the traditions that provide these roots.
The Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876 may serve as an illustration:
A notable provision was the duty imposed on the court to promote reconciliation of differences among persons over whom it had jurisdiction, and
to "encourage and facilitate the settlement in an amicable way, and without
recourse to litigation, of matters in difference between them." This duty
extended not only to civil disputes but criminal matters "not amounting
to felony and not aggravated in degree." (p. 19)
This ordinance seems to recognize African inclinations towards litigiousness Bennion reports that most litigation today still involves questions of title to land
4.

For an elaboration of this difference, see my critique of the concept of "Totalitarianism,"
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5. For an elaboration of the distinction between procedural and substantive sources of

authority, see Herbert J. Spiro, Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach, 56
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(p. 454) - in its proper context of aversion to adversary proceedings and
preference for conciliatory procedures designed to restore old and build up new
consensus. 6 According to one interpretation, this preference is today reflected in
the rejection of oppositional patterns of politics in favor of more or less consensual
"one-party systems," not only by President Nkrumah, who has been criticized
in the West for taking this position, but also by President Nyerere, who has
escaped such criticism.
This suggests that one of the chief benefits we can derive from the comparative study of law and politics in the new states is a broadening of perspective
that may enable us to get down to the rock bottom of truly universal human
needs of justice. We may learn, for example, that there is nothing "natural"
about two-sided, "either/or" adversary proceedings, in courts, in parliaments,
or in world politics of the era of the cold war. If and when we do learn lessons
like this, the grafting of African branches onto the tree of the "Common Law
of Mankind" will yield good fruit.
HERBERT J. Spito

6. Spmo, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 127-129 and passim.
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THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS.

The systematic study of politics has usually been undertaken from the
standpoint of "structure," as MacIver does in The Modern State, or from the
standpoint of "process," an illustration of which is Lasswell's Power and Society.
These alternative orientations are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary, indicative of emphasis, and productive of types of question that arise
naturally in the flow of analysis. Structurally oriented investigation moves
readily in either of two directions. One may concentrate upon the display of
the nature of the state and the analysis of the purposes of political activity,
a path followed by Hocking in his Man and the State. Or starting from a
specification of the principles of governmental structure, as does Macmahon
in his classic essay on American government in the Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, one may proceed to an account of the ways in which structures influence and shape their constituent processes and ultimately to definition of the
distinctive kind of politics generated by the system of institutions under consideration. On the other hand, to begin with a focus on "process" not only
raises questions of power and policy directly but also may lead to the identification of political "functions," seen as being performed by "structures." Here
emerges what may be called the "functional" approach to the study of politics,
the methodological design that gives direction and form to the ambitious
enterprise of Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman, and their collaborators in
The Politics of the Developing Areas.
As defined and used in this work, the functional orientation differs from
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both the structural or institutional approach to the study of politics and the
process or behavioral approach, as these are ordinarily conceived. In functionalism, on the one hand, the concepts of purpose and policy are avoided; on the
other, the notion of process is given a multi-institutional dimension in the shape
of the concept of function. The aim of these conceptual selections and innovations is an analytic and predictive methodology of universal applicability. The
claim advanced is that the functional approach permits comparative analysis of
the politics of both developed and developing polities in a scientific manner.
Functional concepts standardize political activity and so clear the way for its
statistical investigation.
This is a remarkable volume which testifies to the value of cooperative endeavor. It deserves attention not only from specialists in comparative analysis
but also from those concerned with political theory and the theory of political
development. Few books in recent years promise so much by way of increasing
our understanding of political modernization, and none comes so tantalizingly
close to fulfillment of promise. Spectacular conceptual innovation allied with
distinguished application to a wide range of societies offers the theorist much
to ponder and the generalist a swift and lucid introduction to the panoramas
of backward areas. The scope and the ambition of the work demand comment
from many perspectives, but only two will be employed here, at the expense of
justice to what is unquestionably a noteworthy achievement. First, examination
of the assumptions and of the modes of analysis used by Almond and Coleman
raises theoretical problems which require consideration for their own sake. The
utility of a functional political science depends in no small measure upon the
validity of the conception of politics and political activity upon which it is based.
Secondly, the results of their analysis in the form of contributions to the theory
of political development bear directly upon questions of high policy and do
much to establish reliable indicators amidst the bewildering complexity of
change that is too often stereotyped with the term "developing." Formulation
of the principles of political development is the most challenging task in the
path of contemporary political science.
In his theoretical introduction to the book, Almond argues that the functional
is to be preferred to institutional and legal perspectives in the comparative
analysis of developed and developing polities. He does not examine the full
range of alternative conceptual orientations, but quickly, perhaps somewhat
cavalierly, the concept of the state and its traditional correlative conceptions are
discarded as sterile and unilluminating. Attention is directed to political reality
by means of concepts such as "articulation" and "aggregation" of interests, and
these constitute only two from the spectrum of functional categories produced in
a theoretical effort that is at once both powerful and constricted. This functional
apparatus is held to have the very great virtue of recognizing the existence of
a "continuum" of polities and so forestalling the temptation to dichotomize
polities into those which are states and those which are not. Adoption of functionalism is recommended on the ground that it alone makes possible systematic
comparison of polities along the continuum with a view to the eventual acquisition of a genuinely scientific political science. Both the operational failure of
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the institutional and the cultural limitations of the behavioral methodologies
are noticed as considerations reinforcing the invitation to functionalism.
The theoretical and empirical impact of functionalism is indeed energizing.
Still one need not be overly Hegelian to wonder whether comparison of polities
along a functionally defined continuum may not unduly minimize the significance
of that singular product of Western political development, the constitutional
and national state. Perhaps no analytical apparatus could entirely dispense with
the concept of state, and equivalents for it must be found in expressions such
as "the modem political system." In his theoretical essay, Almond explains:
What is unique in the modem political system is a political socialization
function which creates a distinct loyalty and membership on the part
of the individual in the general political system, and a tendency to penetrate and affect the socialization processes of other social systems, such
as the family and church, so that they introduce general citizenship content into their socialization processes. (p. 30)
No doubt a clinical tone and stance, rather than metaphysical humility, are
appropriate when confronting states. Nevertheless, the record of Western political experience does suggest that the type of political system called a state
characteristically generates and sustains, despite deflections and regressions, a
uniquely purposive kind of political activity. Is not more involved in the invention and the definition of state, especially in the perspectives of comparative
political development, than a distinctive "political socialization function"? Reliance upon law and legal techniques rather than upon ethical maxims enforced
through stultifying forms of bureaucratic and social control; steady reflection
upon the proper scope and the effective control of political authority; universalistic rather than particularistic avenues to security, compatible with personal
initiative and moral freedom; a concern with justice as one chief goal of political activity, coeval with the inclusiveness of political society; qualities of
character and personality that John Stuart Mill summed up in the term "active";
the institutional articulation of shared purpose - all of these features of Western
civilization as well as its characteristic rationality would appear to be connected
with the appearance and the consolidation of those political structures known
as states. Almond's functional description of political activity does enable him
to locate polities along a continuum. The price, however, would appear to be
neglect of the special purposes and consequences of political activity when that
is organized within and directed through the framework of the constitutional
and national state. The difference between state politics and polity politics may
ultimately be only a matter of degree, but if so, surely it would be imprudent
at this stage of the investigation to minimize that difference.
These reflections suggest that the analysis of the differences between Western
political experience and the experience of the developing areas is not likely to
be complete if reliance is placed entirely upon a conceptual apparatus that
dissolves the significance of statehood. This result would hold even though in
highly fluid and unstable polities, where structures undergo constant change,
the functional approach should prove to be the more appropriate and useful.
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Institutional flux produces political behavior in the raw, unshaped by institutions and peculiarly suitable to functionalist and behaviorist techniques of investigation. Discovery of principles of political development, however, may require more historical and less statistical modes of analysis.
It would be more than merely elegant to design a conceptual apparatus applicable equally to developed and developing polities along functional lines. If
such could be done without serious distortions of historical experience, it would
constitute a finding of immense cultural significance. However, in the present
state of our knowledge, it cannot be assumed that universal analytical tools must
be functional in design. In advanced and stable societies institutional modes of
analysis have much to contribute to our grasp of political phenomena. Functionalism and behaviorism seem especially useful in the contexts of change and
instability. In any event, adaptation of conceptual tools to circumstance does
not require as a premise dismissal of the "state" and related concepts as inherited hindrances. Contributors to the volume remark that the idea of the
state comes to the developing areas as an ideal and as an aspiration. This state
of affairs in itself cautions against replacement of concepts intrinsic to Western
political development by functional definitions of political activity in order to
achieve statistical comparability.
There is a disconcerting obliqueness, the source of which is difficult to locate, to the theoretical portions of The Politics of the Developing Areas.1 Perhaps
more explicit recognition of the historical purposes of political activity revealed
in Western political development would serve adequately both to correct and to
enlarge the functionalist angle of vision. One can readily assent to the proposition that "The mode of performance of the aggregative function is crucial to
the performance of the political system as a whole." (p. 44) Moreover, this
statement has a bracing ethical neutrality combined with a generality that has
the stamp of science. The trouble is that if one excludes from one's analytic
equipment concepts that are normative and purposive, both produced from
and essential to the description of Western political experience, such as justice
and constitutionalism, then it becomes difficult to formulate principles descriptive of that experience. The interrelationships that arise among values and institutions in a historical process that could be phrased in terms of principles
resist a functional definition. Further, to substitute the concept of function for
that of purpose in the analysis of political activity may lead one to overlook
consideration of the extent to which convergent development of political institutions may be anticipated. The logical and the psychological connections between values and institutions may be more strict than the vocabulary of functionalism appears to imply.
Clearly the problem of designing a conceptual framework adequate for comparative explication of the processes of political development is a massive one.
It cannot be solved through stylized confrontations of institutional and behavioral categories. Only through their empirical application can programs of
1. In this connection, see Roy Pierce, Comparative Politics: Liberty and Policy as VariAMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 655-60 (1963).
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analysis be finally tested. In this connection, it is worth noticing Coleman's
concluding observation that the secondary purpose of The Politics of the Developing Areas, improvement of our understanding of the processes of political
change or modernization, "has been fulfilled only to a very limited extent." (p.
576) The constant danger in social and political analysis is that one's selection
of concepts may contain unsuspected limitations and so fail to disclose all relevant empirical regularities and relationships. Functionalism runs this danger
through its present exclusion of value and institutional categories inherent in
older historical modes of analysis. It may be remarked that in the essays devoted to the developing areas more use is made of these categories than undiluted functionalism would perhaps allow. The question of the most inclusive
and most appropriate conceptual framework in terms of which to compare the
development of Western and non-Western polities remains an open one.
A paradoxical outcome of The Politics of the Developing Areas is that the
functional approach when applied in a comparative manner would appear to
produce essentially undynamic results. Statistical comparisons seem to summarize
data into a sort of map of the existing situation in the developing areas rather
than to provide a set of principles or hypotheses descriptive of the dynamics of
political development. Still the data presented, combined with the analyses of
specific polities, support a description of social and political change as "tide-like,"
an expression used to describe such phenomena in a forthcoming work on
political science by J. Roland Pennock and David G. Smith. It is of even greater
interest that statistical compilation and analysis lend support to the hypothesis
that economic development and political competitiveness are positively correlated.
Statistical methods do not disclose the ways in which politics and economics are
interdependent; but the correlation is quite consistent with results achieved by
more institutional modes of analysis, as for example, in MacIver's contention
that democracy is inherent in industrial civilization. Yet alongside of this generalization we may place the finding that the introduction of universal suffrage
would appear initially to reinforce attitudes and attachments that are incompatible with modern political society. Inevitably the process of modernization is
an uneven, tide-like process, itself composed of disparate tendencies, the management of which demands political leadership and institutional innovation of
a very high order if competitive politics within the framework of constitutional
and national states is to be established and sustained.
The experience of both the developed and the developing polities shows
that political development is a process far from smooth. However, in view of
the fundamental correlation between economic and political development which
this volume brings so strikingly to light, there is ground perhaps for something
more than the attitude of cheerful pessimism recommended by Raymond Aron.
The volatility of politics and the fragility of many of the developing polities
together render political forecasting a perilous business. Still the statistical tides
beneath the waves of politics and the story of Western development both invite
a cautious optimism.
The Politics of the Developing Areas rises to the challenge of our time and
attempts the heroic task of conceptual innovation followed by empirical ap-
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plication. The magnitude and the relevance of the effort of its authors cannot
but evoke admiration and promote reflection in basic directions. To what extent are functional categories of analysis adequate to the discovery of principles
of political development? How far does functionalism require supplementation
with concepts drawn from more traditional modes of analysis? These are the
questions, I suggest, that students of political theory and political development
will find compelling. On the basis of the volume itself, the functional approach
would appear, so far at least, to be most appropriate to the construction of a
map of the political situation in the developing areas. A map is a very useful
thing, and some developmental principles of great importance may be discerned.
But a map lacks those historical, purposive, and institutional dimensions without
which our understanding of both political activity and political development will
remain imperfect. In the end, The Politics of the Developing Areas is a magnifi-

cent demonstration of the vitality of political science and suggests the desirability
of making that discipline more cumulative.
JOHN W. CHAPMAN

THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW.

By Eugene V. Rostow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp.
xxxix, 318. $6.00.
Dean Rostow's title - and his theme - are taken from Holmes: "Where
there is doubt the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised
and unconscious, the judges are called on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of
choice."' It is a theme which academic criticism of the Supreme Court's performance has recently tended to neglect. Rostow's book may help restore
perspective.
The Sovereign Prerogative is a collection of papers originally prepared for
delivery as lectures or for periodical publication or both. The basic points the
book makes with respect to the Supreme Court are found primarily in the four
papers "American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession," 2 "The Court
and Its Critics," 3 "The Supreme Court and the People's Will,"4 and "The Democratic Character of Judicial Review." 5 All of these papers teach a central lesson:
that the process of constitutional adjudication in the United States is essentially
a common law process; and that at its best that process has been informed with
that avoidance of generality, that concentration on the facts of the particular
case, that suspicion of purely logical judgments, and that attunement to the
teaching of experience which characterize the common law approach.
1.
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This is a lesson easily remembered - that "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience" 6 is now a commonplace; but it is one also easily forgotten. Application of the lesson demands critical wisdom and humility. Some
very learned critics of the Court have ignored it. It is in the long run vain to
suppose that a few brilliantly conceived general principles will carry the day and
can be a substitute for the processes of case-by-case adjudication, erratic and
untidy as they may seem. 7 Only a general revisio'n of human nature - not likely to be achieved, despite academic efforts - might bring this about. 8
The great triumphs of the present-day Court have been triumphs in the common law tradition. The classic example to this reviewer is the steady growth of
the exclusionary rule - that evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure
was not to be received in a criminal trial. The logical arguments are against
the rule - Professor Wigmore, as a matter of logic, virtually demolished
it in a celebrated passage of logical brilliance and scholarly wrongheadedness that
has hardly been equalled. 9 The historical logical basis of the rule's introduction
as one binding in federal criminal prosecutions might not bear analytic scrutiny. 1 0 Yet the rule survived as one binding in the Federal Courts, was embraced
by a growing number of state courts, and finally was held to be binding on the
states under the Federal Constitution."l The reason was a powerful one: experience taught that without the rule the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was a dead letter. 1 2 The growth of the rule was in the
case-by-case, pragmatic manner of the common law.
Rostow wisely does not deny that logic and doctrinal analysis have a place
in constitutional adjudication. They are important values, and it is well that
much time is spent on them; but it is wrong to view them as absolutes. Searching
academic criticism of the Court's opinions is important. But it is wrong to put a
primary emphasis on doctrinal considerations in judging the Court's product. The
spirit that experiences an apocalyptic vision upon encountering a logical difficulty
or inconsistency in a judicial decision (if its prophecy of doom is not adopted
simply as a pose or pedagogical device), reveals a failure to understand the
nature of the common law judicial process. It is entirely possible, one might
add, to conduct a brilliant - and searching - sustained critical analysis of the
doctrinal adequacies or inadequacies of judicial opinions without continually announcing the sounding of the last trumpet. The late Professor T. R. Powell's
work might be cited as a model of this.' 3
Unfortunately, this overemphasis on doctrinal considerations often has as its
6.
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handmaiden the attitude that the Courts should not solve questions that do not
readily yield themselves to a solution in terms of logical analysis. Under it, for
example, the idea has been expressed that Courts must keep hands off the area of
freedom of expression and leave the matter to the other branches of government and to an informed public opinion. Some of Judge Learned Hand's
writings1 4 and a celebrated article of Elliott Richardson1 5 are the classic examples. Sometimes, under the influence of this point of view, the recurrent pipe
dream is expressed that dependence on the courts as the protector of constitutional liberties causes a debility in the other agencies of government, and that the
general constitutional tone might be improved if the courts took a hands-off attitude. It is probably fair to say that this attitude - a prevalent one, appropriately
enough, in the early 1950's - has had a disastrous effect on the constitutional
guaranties. Rostow's view of the Court's functions has no place for it.
Rostow brilliantly defends the consistency of the Court's function in constitutional review with the democratic concept. He demolishes the view that
would defend the faineant approach on the theory that it is more "democratic"
for appointive judges not to interfere in these matters. As to matters of state power,
he cogently points out that there is no area of substantive state action that the
present Court has barred to the States. In fact, the Court was interpreted by Congress as going so far in permitting the taxation by the States of businesses engaged
in interstate commerce that Congress set limits to state action by statute. 1 6 It
is in the area of procedure that the Court moves mainly when reviewing State
action. The celebrated cases of the last few years - Baker v. Carr,17 Mapp v.
Ohio,18 and Gideon v. Wainwright19 - are object lessons.
Rostow's book has - though not to a disabling degree - the common weaknesses of books which are collections of papers delivered over the course of years.
Some of the papers are tangential to the main theme. Others are rather dated
(the papers have not been updated for book publication). But this latter fault
is not without its virtues. The reader is stimulated to find applications of Rostow's
ideas in the more recent product of the Court. And one is favorably struck with
the fact that the passage of time has treated these essays well - better, this reviewer thinks, than it has "Freedom of Expression andI the Function of Courts,"
"The Time Chart of the Justices," and "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" - essays whose thinking is at odds with Rostow's. That is one of the
ultimate tests of a set of ideas about the law; and so far Rostow's show every sign
of passing it.
DENNIS G. LYONS
14.
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By H. L. A. Hart. Stanford: Stanford University
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LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY.

The three lectures collected in this slim but important volume resume a controversy that has been one of the recurrent themes of legal philosophy: is it the
function of law to enforce the moral convictions of a community, or is the function
of law a more limited one, as expressed classically by John Stuart Mill in his essay
On Liberty - "the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to
others"? The controversy has recently been revived in England in various exchanges between Professor Hart and Lord Devlin.1 Dean Rostow of the Yale
Law School has contributed to the controversy by an article first published in the
Cambridge Law journal and recently republished in The Sovereign Prerogative
(1962).
Topical and concrete significance has been given to this age-old problem by a
hotly debated decision of the House of Lords of 1961, which supplies the subject
matter of a major part of Hart's first lecture. In Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecution,2 the House of Lords resurrected the old common law offense called "conspiracy to corrupt public morals," created by the Star Chamber, from what, in
Hart's expression, "many had thought was its grave, the 18th century," by making
it a concurrent ground (not an obiter dictum) for the conviction of Mr. Shaw.
In an attempt to bypass the Street Offenses Act of 1959, which sought to drive
prostitutes off the streets by imposing heavy penalties for solicitation, this ingenious
defendant had composed, and procured the publication of, a magazine called
The Ladies' Directory. This gave the names and addresses of prostitutes as well
as their nude photographs and an indication in code of their sexual practices.
Although it would seem that the courts could have rested Shaw's conviction on
the statutory offense against the Sexual Offenses Act of 1956 and the Obscene
Publication Act of 1959, the House specifically and emphatically -with one dissent- affirmed the conviction under the common law offense. It thus revived
the controversy not only on the law's function as protector of morality, but also on
the role of the judiciary in the creation of new criminal offenses under the guise
of the application of an old common law offense of such a general and ubiquitous
ambit as to give virtual carte blanche.
Hart does not concern himself principally in these lectures with the second
aspect, which has also been amply discussed in the debate following this decision.
Suffice it to say that in the opinion of the present reviewer, as in that of the
majority of commentators, the emphatic assertion, especially by Lord Simonds, of
the power and duty of the courts to use long-entombed common law offenses
preceding the age of developed statutory law, as a vehicle for the translation of
moral indignation into criminal offense, is a regrettable example of judicial lawmaking in the wrong sphere and for the wrong reasons. No one has been more
emphatic than Lord Simonds in rejecting the function of the courts in the de1.
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velopment of the civil common law, e.g., in the field of contracts or torts, where
Parliament seldom finds time to intervene. Typical of this approach are his statements in Jacobs v. L. C. C.3 and in Scruttons v. Midland Silicones.4 In the former
case, where the House of Lords rejected an obvious opportunity to overcome the
absurd distinctions -since
abolished- between licensees and invitees, Lord
Simonds observed as follows:
. . . it would, I think, be to deny the importance, I would say the paramount
importance, of certainty in the law to give less than coercive effect to the
unequivocal statement of the law made after argument by three members of
this House in Fairman'scase. Nor, perhaps I may add, are your Lordships
entitled to disregard such a statement because you would have the law otherwise. To determine what the law is, not what it ought to be, is our present task.
In the latter case, he rejected any departure from the doctrine of privity of contract
in the following words:
For to me heterodoxy, or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive
because it is dignified by the name of reform. Nor will I easily be led by an
undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind of justice to ignore our first duty,
which is to administer justice according to law, the law which is established
for us by Act of Parliament or the binding authority of precedent. The law
is developed by the application of old principles to new circumstances. Therein
lies its genius. Its reform by the abrogation of these principles is the task not of
the courts of law but of Parliament.
But when it came to the sweeping extension of an old common law offense in
a manner that was in effect lawmaking, the above-mentioned statement of
the same learned Law Lord reveals a diametrically opposite approach. It revives in substance the attempt made by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 19335
to declare any "acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community" to
be indictable offenses. This attempt had been all but universally condemned
6
by legal commentators.
In his dissenting judgment Lord Reed convincingly protested against this way
of usurping the function of Parliament, in a situation where Parliament had
recently acted, and where, moreover, it was possible to base the conviction of the
defendant on statutory offenses. The observation of Lord Simonds - "must we
wait till Parliament finds time to deal with such conduct? I say, my Lords, that
if the common law is powerless in such an event then we should no longer do her
reverence. But I say that her hand is still powerful and that it is for her Majesty's
Judges to play the part which Lord Mansfield points out to them" - is characterized by Hart with a subtle irony, as a "fine specimen of English judicial rhetoric
in the baroque manner." It does, however, point to a deeper problem of jurisprudence and directly leads to Hart's principal concern, the use of law - in the
form of what is virtually an unlimited brief for the potential creation of a new
offense - as an outlet for moral indignation. One of the most eminent of con3.
4.
5.

[1950] A.C. 361 at 373.
[1962] A.C. 446 at 467-68.
The King v. Manly, [1933] 1 K. B. 529.

6.

See the discussion in GLANVILLE

WILLIAMS,

CRIMINAL LAW 455ff. (1953).

W. FRIEDMANN
temporary British jurists, Lord Devlin, generally affirms that law does have the
task of enforcing morals, in opposition to the Wolfenden Committee's report on
the punishment of homosexuality, "that there must be a realm of morality and
immorality which is not the law's business." 7 But Lord Devlin's thesis that "suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive
activity" appears to be more moderate than Lord Simonds' statement in Shaw's
case. The task of the law in the enforcement of morality is essentially justified
by Lord Devlin as necessary for the preservation of society. Hart characterizes it
as a "moderate" as compared with the "extreme" thesis, which regards it as a
duty of the law to enforce morality "as a thing of value even if immoral acts harm
no one directly, or indirectly, by weakening the moral cement of society." This
latter thesis appears to be the one held by Lord Simonds.
Hart opposes this moralizing view of the law and generally supports John
Stuart Mill's view that the law has the more limited function of protecting the
social order. In Hart's subtle and restrained discussion of this issue, two interconnected aspects appear to this reviewer to be outstanding in importance. The
first is that the theory which regards the law as the proper vehicle for the enforcement of morality assumes that the moral convictions of the society in question are
clear and unanimous. This, however, is emphatically not true of a society which
is based on freedom of criticism and which is pluralistic, as distinguished from the
monolithic character of a rigidly doctrinaire society, whether of the fascist, communist, or theocratic pattern. The subject of the Wolfenden Committee report
well illustrates this point. The Committee recommended that the criminal law of
England should be amended so as to abolish the criminality of homosexual activities carried on between adult males in private, without involving any element of
public order. The reason for widespread doubt about the social or even the ethical
value of the present state of the law is not, of course, the approval of homosexuality between males (homosexuality between females has never been considered as a criminal offense) but that homosexual inclinations are more
a matter for medical and psychiatric treatment than for legal punishment, and
that the characterization of such inclinations as criminal has been used mainly for
blackmail and other forms of extortion which are neither socially nor morally
desirable. The recommendations of the Wolfenden Committee, which proposed
the abolition of the offense by a majority of twelve to one, failed to be translated
into law by a Government fearful of reactions in Parliament, and especially in the
House of Lords, where the views expressed by Lord Simonds' observations in
Shaw's case are fairly representative.
Nobody would assert that this Committee, composed of highly respected, responsible, and distinguished citizens, was indifferent to the preservation of moral
standards in contemporary Britain. What led to its all but unanimous recommendation was the appreciation of the balance of considerations of public policy
which, in the Committee's view, made the preservation of the criminal offense
socially and ethically much more undesirable than its abolition. Apart from this
consideration of the balance of social values and interests, which made it seem
7.
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more important to block a source of unscrupulous blackmail than to continue to
use the law as a vehicle for the expression of the sexual morality of the average
man, the Committee also displayed a wise insight into the limitations of law:
"There must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is in brief,
in crude terms, not the law's business."
The second of Hart's major contentions is that the use of criminal law as the
guardian of morality is a way of impeding the response of law to social change.
The change which has unquestionably occurred in the modern appraisal of homosexuality by many sections of public opinion in many countries, largely as the result
of modem medical and psychological research, is equally evident in other spheres
of even greater social importance, e.g., in the fields of divorce and birth control.
This is not the place to discuss the pros and cons of a liberalization of divorce
laws or the legitimation of birth control by contraceptive device. In both these
fields, there are deeply felt clashes of religious, ethical, and social convictions,
especially between the Catholic Church and other religious and nonreligious
philosophies. Whatever one's personal views may be on this matter, it can surely
not be denied that the issues of divorce and birth control do present the most
serious problems. Thus, the discrepancy between the laws of divorce, as they still
prevail in the Eastern States, and the practice of divorce, does seriously undermine
the respect for legal order by giving official sanction to systematic fraud and collusion; again, the continued criminality of abortion in all but very extreme cases
leads to a proliferation of illegal and undetected abortions, while the opposition to
official centers for family planning may contribute to the ultimate extermination
of mankind, not by nuclear bombs but by an intolerable rate of acceleration in an
already frightening increase in the population, especially of the poorest countries.
The significance of Hart's discussion lies precisely in this: that the expansion
of law beyond its universally accepted province of protecting the public order and
preventing harm tends to suppress or intolerably delay the translation of social
change into legal change. The causes of social change are many: new scientific
insights, changing social conditions (such as the revolutionary change in the ratio
of births and deaths in the contemporary world), changing ethical beliefs, or
changes in the political pattern of society. It is important, at least in any legal
system that prides itself on being the expression of a "free society," not to block the
legitimate outlets for these manifold streams of social life by using the law to
enforce the convictions of what is almost invariably the morality of a previous age
defended by the most conservative sections of society. Ultimately the consequences
of such an undue extension of the province of law can only be an increasingly
widespread contempt for the law - as illustrated by modern divorce procedure or
the practice of abortion in the countries in which it is theoretically outlawed or else, in the most serious cases, revolution.
Hart has discussed only certain aspects of this enormously important problem,
but the way in which he has underlined and sharpened the basic issues makes a
study of his lectures indispensable reading for anybody who wishes to have an
insight into the proper function of law, beyond the easy rhetoric of moral indignation.
W. FRIEDMANN
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As is well known, the social sciences have been plagued with conceptual
difficulties during this century. It is widely perceived that theoretical models of
our social experience, models relevant to the unique problems of this era, are
required if we are to have much chance of adapting successfully our mores and
institutions to its revolutionary tempo of change. It is scarcely surprising in this
context of perplexity that a revival of interest in natural law and the ens moralia
of civil society has appeared in recent years in the wider scholarly community. Parallel to such scholarly inquiry has been the visible growth among lay
publics of a quest for conceptual systems or ideologies which purport to order
the chaos implicit in our complex and immensely mutable social life. On one
level, this urge to order has been most obviously manifested in the mass attractions
to Marxist-Leninist or Fascist models of man and society, and on quite another
level in the widespread influence which works like Spengler's Decline of the
West and Toynbee's A Study of History have enjoyed among lay publics in this
country.

A difficulty arises here, however-one which drives a wedge quite deeply
between most contemporary social scientists and the publics outside academe.
These scholars are keenly aware of the urgent, continuing need for empirical
research and reasonably hard data as preconditions for the construction of
models which can genuinely illumine their fields of study. The more lacking
such data are, and the more traditionally "impressionist" the field is within the
broader spectrum of the social sciences, the more likely it will be that any effort
to construct grand theory will prove premature and abortive. It would seem,
for example, that in many subdivisions of political science the really pressing
need of the times is for middle-level theory which is constructed from careful
research and a mastery of the relevant data.
Such social scientists are likely to view premature grand theory with some
measure of justified skepticism. Thus the Fachwissenschaftler within the historical profession, for example, have easily exploded those sections of Spengler's
or Toynbee's works which intersect their own specialties; by so doing, they seem
to discredit not only the latters' systems but systematizing in general. The consequence of all this, not surprisingly, has been to inhibit the creation of syntheses
of knowledge within many of the social sciences and, indeed, to create a marked
theoretical anemia among many of its research specialists. Within political science
the result has tended to include the proliferation of research with no visible
conceptual center and, as David Easton remarked a decade ago, the degeneration
of political theory into a descriptive historicism.
I
George E. Gordon Catlin of McGill University has, over the decades, been
one of the very few writers in North America who have sought to bridge this
gap between grand theory and research projects and to provide us with orienting
concepts which can be genuinely useful tools of political analysis. Systematic
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Politics is the massive fruit of four decades of thought about the nature and
behavioral uniformities of political man. It is an impressive achievement.
There is naturally some danger involved for a reviewer who attempts concisely to summarize the argument of a 400-page book, especially when the
author weaves so rich a verbal tapestry as does Catlin. Nevertheless, the major
outlines of the argument of Systematic Politics are not difficult to follow, though
the involutions of the author's prose sometimes are. This work is divided into
two major parts: "Political Science," which deals with the behavioral and
institutional patterns centering upon the exercise of power; and "Political
Theory," in which the author seeks to relate power, its uses and manifestations,
to the larger individual and corporate ends of political society.
Catlin was one of the first political scientists to make a decisive break with
the descriptive-institutional approach which dominated the field for so many
decades. He has long emphasized the interrelated character of the study of
politics and sociology; here he reiterates this view to the extent of asserting
that the two are virtually indivisible. The author has also been well known for
his view that the concept of power is a central frame of reference for the political
scientist- above all for the isolation and definition of the political act. This
view Catlin also reiterates in Systematic Politics. Politics is concerned with the
social function which is performed by control, and with the behavior patterns
and institutional structures which result from the control relationships of human
wills. Catlin argues, in the classical vein which is an extremely prominent aspect
of this entire work, that the will is the agent by which each of us seeks to
pursue his ends; power alone provides the freedom to do this, and to determine
which will shall prevail. This power, of course, need not manifest itself in brute
force; but, whatever its form, everyone pursues it as the indispensable means
whereby he may be liberated to realize his ends. Consequently, the author
asserts, all politics is by its nature power politics, whether practiced by ecclesiastics, political bosses, capitalists, or commissars.
Catlin's discussion of freedom and authority follows logically from this view.
There is, he argues, a primordial urge to freedom in man. This urge is literally
an instinct, though he hastens to add that its particular time- and culture-bound
expressions are not instinctive but are culturally conditioned liberty (or liberties).
But freedom, like all other goods, exists in a finite world of limitations whose
chief political law seems to be that one has to choose between obtaining goods
and paying for them, or not having them. This analogy to the economic marketplace upon which Catlin relies extensively involves among other things the
recognition that freedom and authority exist not in a sharply dualistic or dichotomous relationship, but in a dialectical polarity. Discussing either in vacuo as though freedom could ever exist in any human society without that system
of social controls and constraints known as authority- is endlessly productive
of distorted thinking about politics.
From this general law of the political market another is derived: that the
achievement of any particular liberty by political means involves sacrificing a
more generalized freedom to do as we wish. Moreover, this idea of the market,
with its relatively distinct categories of producer and consumer, is employed
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shrewdly to explore the relationship between government and citizen in democratic societies, the differences between democracies and dictatorships, and the
preconditions of revolution. In theory democracy conforms to a consumers'
market in which freedom is maximized: that is, the consumers (the electorate)
exercise controls over the producers (governmental officials) through demands
upon them which may achieve legitimate institutional expression (party politics),
with the ultimate sanction of replacing the producers temporarily in charge with
others if they fail to deliver the goods desired actively by most of the consumers.
This model, of course, applies only to what is usually called representative democracy. Elements of pure democracy, as Catlin sagely observes, tend strongly
to be resisted by the producers-who, of course, develop a specific set of interests of their own in preserving their decision-making roles-unless the producers can reasonably be assured that effective power will still remain in
governmental hands. One could write much of American political history with
this insight at its center. Struggles for control between consumer and producer
elements have included the original struggles for and against universal suffrage;
the popular movements at the turn of this century which led to the direct election
of senators, the initiative, referendum and recall, and the introduction of the
direct primary; and the repeated attacks upon and defenses of the Supreme
Court's exercise between 1890 and 1937 of a broad veto over socioeconomic
legislation.
A governmental regime which is consumer-oriented labors under a number
of well-known disadvantages. It has difficulty in raising the costs of government
to its supporters in time of need or emergency. An obvious, though perhaps less
than supremely important, example at present is found in the taxpayers' revolts
against new bond issues for expansion of local educational and social services
which have been necessitated by the growth of the population. Another major
difficulty which Catlin mentions is that involved in restriction of customary
liberties by government, even in the face of dangerous international competition.
The more or less extreme dispersiveness of a democratic regime may be one of
its chief glories, but it may prove a fatal defect not only in contests with centralized dictatorships, but domestically when dispersiveness produces deadlock and
renders excessively difficult the timely resolution of issues and the distribution
of governmental goods for which there is steadily increasing demand. The consequence may be popular acceptance of dictatorship-a form of government
akin to a monopolistic producers' market, with authority maximized.
As Catlin quite correctly, though not originally, observes, every government
is actually to a degree an oligarchy. Preponderant power will be lodged in the
hands of those few who actively work to sustain the established authorities.
There is a chronic source of danger to the stability of all regimes, whether
theoretically producer- or consumer-oriented: their unwillingness or actual
inability to provide political goods for which there is strong demand. The few
who are in control of the apparatus may well find it a far simpler matter to
shape consumer opinion into demanding that which the regime can supply
than to attempt to supply those goods which might undercut the position of
the producers themselves. This obviously valid insight applies not only to the
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centralized control structure of totalitarian regimes but also, it is becoming
increasingly clear, to the more dispersed but manipulative elites within such
formal representative democracies as the United States. This insight is worthy
of more extended analytical treatment than Catlin gives it in Systematic Politics-if only because it touches so centrally upon political issues which are
of the most direct concern to us today.
At this point Catlin's discussion shifts toward an examination of the Good
Polity -the
end to which politics and the uses of power are means. This discussion, like the larger argument of the book itself, bears a heavy classical stamp.
There is a grand tradition of civilized values which can be learned from a
study of history and other humanistic disciplines. This tradition is one of the
primary sources for ascertaining the objective existence and characteristics of
natural law. For, as Catlin insists, "The basis of sound law lies in human nature
itself" (p. 351), and the Good Polity - whatever its specific cultural characteristics- will seek to organize its law and the education of its citizens so that the
closest possible harmony exists between the uniformities of human nature and
the political institutions and behavior of the society itself.
Perhaps Catlin would accept as a short summary of the kind of natural law
which he has in mind Justinian's austerely concise formulation: honestum vivere,
alienum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. In any event, he takes sharp issue
with those who seek to construct an elaborate system of morally charged
deductions from the highly general principles of natural law. Specific codes
of morality, he argues, can be excluded from consideration without denying
the objective existence of natural law itself or its central importance to a
realistic science of politics. For instance, the experience of mankind has been
quite uniform concerning the personal and social effects of repeated alcoholic
bouts. Indicative as such bouts are of a serious disruption of the individual's own
potential harmony, they ultimately, if persisted in, lead to incapacitation and
death. One is legally free to walk off a cliff if he chooses; but if he does so,
certain consequences will inexorably follow from that choice. This is not to say
that natural law has no moral component for Catlin, but rather, perhaps, that
it has no moralistic component. He seeks carefully to distinguish between the
categorical-moral-imperative approach to natural law which has so frequently
dominated discussion of the subject and the descriptive function which he regards
as primary for his purposes.
But if Catlin seems to dismiss elaborate deductive systems, his approach to
natural law may still be regarded as very close to the classical Catholic tradition.
He emphasizes- as, he notes, have Catholic theorists- the primacy of reason
in this field and the strong need for avoiding mere subjective sentimentalities in
dealing with it. His criticisms both of the Erastian, sultanist interpretations of
law-as-command and of sovereignty arising from the Renaissance, and of the
atomistic, subjectivist natural-rights philosophies arising from the Reformation
and the Enlightenment, are alike deeply rooted in this view of natural law. The
Good Polity is first and foremost a community. This community is sustained by
right education of its citizens in such matters as their reciprocal rights and duties,
the importance of self-limitation of impulses toward unrestrained freedom, the
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legitimate role of an aristocracy of virtue within the political system, and the
right understanding of human fraternity as a religio-moral imperative quite at
variance with the false doctrine of unlimited human equality. The harmony
which arises from a just equipoise of freedom and authority, of self-fulfillment
and self-restraint, and from a recognition of the falsity of political doctrines
rooted in rigid dichotomies between individual and collective, is thus a basic
end of political action.
With all his concern for political behavior, then, Catlin remains in the last
analysis within a tradition which finds its roots in the Greeks, and which has
recently been restated by such writers as John Courtney Murray and Walter
Lippmann. Let us turn to an analysis of this contribution to the Great Tradition.
II
There are both methodological and substantive grounds for criticism of
Systematic Politics. One drawback which can be mentioned at the outset is the
author's style. Normally the critic should do the author the courtesy of letting
him develop his material in his own way, but a rigid adherence to this rule
would make criticism itself impossible in many instances. This book repays
reading, but there can be no doubt that the opacities of Catlin's prose are likely
to discourage all but the most pertinacious from following his reasoning as
closely as it merits. Catlin also rather overplays the citation and quotation of
other - mostly contemporary - authors in his text. That he has read vastly
there is no doubt. But the piling of name upon name, reference upon reference,
and quotation upon quotation, distracts the reader - and one may perhaps
suspect, the writer as well. Not surprisingly, the uses to which some of these
references are put - most notably the contributions of C. Wright Mills and the
Marxists - do considerably less than justice either to their valid insights into
the problems of power in industrial society or to their contributions to contemporary social theory.
There is also a serious question as to the analytical usefulness of Catlin's
views concerning the nature of political science as a discipline. He has been
a trail blazer who has significantly assisted generations of scholars to turn their
attention toward political sociology and political behavior. Great honor is due
him for these contributions. But his insistence upon the virtual identity of political science and sociology appears quite misplaced. The definition of political
science as "the study of society as organized" seems so broad and vague as to
be virtually useless as a frame of analytical reference. Economics certainly deals
with essential aspects of society as organized, as do sociology, anthropology, and
social psychology. There can be no question but that each of these disciplines,
as they intersect essentially political concerns, can immensely fertilize understanding of political action and institutions. Political scientists must consequently
assimilate such of these insights as they can into their own work. It is suggested,
however, that as a detailed knowledge of marginal analysis or of totemism and
exogamy is not actually required for the study of politics, neither are such purely
sociological concerns as marriage and the family, suicide, or adolescent-gang
behavior an integral part of political science as a discipline.
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It seems probable that this sweeping merger of politics and sociology is a
logical corollary of Catlin's preoccupation with power as a central concern of
political science. Power, as he points out, is relational; it is the fruit of human
interaction. Consequently, it is found in every conceivable kind of social situation
the family or tribe, in primary work- and play-groups, and so on. But
-within
is political science concerned with every kind of power relationship existing in
society? The answer, rather clearly, is no. That power is a central aspect of
politics goes without saying; but only those species of power relationships which
are related not only to individual and group interaction but to authoritative
social institutions can be considered directly relevant to political science as a
discipline. It is incidentally worth noting that this argument may be inclusive
as well as exclusive: for instance, as such nominally "private" organizations as
labor unions and especially industrial corporations acquire ever wider decisionmaking power in contemporary "society as organized" - to the extent that
they may quite accurately be described as private governments-they become
quite legitimately part of the political scientist's business. Organization theory,
of great importance to the study of public administration, should and does rely
heavily upon the structural characteristics of such industrial entities.
In view of the foregoing argument, it might be better to move away from
power as a primary frame of reference and toward the kind of definition which
David Easton has sought to provide in The PoliticalSystem (1953) -the authoritative allocation of values. As Easton observes, this is a triune definition. What is
done is authoritative;that is, the arrangements involved are binding upon the entire polity to the extent that the binding agency enjoys the accepted authority (including, if necessary, the coercive means) to carry them out. It is an allocation;
that is, the consequence of the action is to distribute, necessarily unequally, a limited supply of certain things to the individuals and groups of which the polity is
composed. Finally, that which is thus authoritatively allocated is a value or values,
which may be in the areas of material benefits, social status or prestige, or ideological or morally charged values, or (as is very often the case) a composite of
all of these. The insistence upon authoritativeness excludes power relationships
which have no obvious bearing upon public policy, as the insistence upon values
tends to exclude, for the most part, that allocation of material goods and services
which is primarily the legitimate concern of economics.
As we have said, there are not a few fruitful insights which can be found
in the pages of Systematic Politics. Catlin's producer-consumer model sheds a
great deal of light upon the behavioral relationships between power-holders and
power-addressees in any society. Edmond Cahn has been exploring the usefulness of a similar model in the field of public law and, especially in his most recent
work, The Predicament of Democratic Man (1961), has employed it with considerable success. Catlin's models of democracy as a maximized consumers' market
and of dictatorship as a maximized producers' market seem quite reasonable and
potentially useful approximations to political reality. So too is his observation
that political dirigeants will prefer to manipulate consumer demand into safe
channels rather than permit that demand to focus upon political goods which
they are not equipped to supply. The author's insistence upon the indispensability
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to any viable polity of a community rooted in law which is congruent to the
basic structure of human nature is, of course, much more debatable in the
scholarly world at large. The noisy intellectual battle between Platonists and
anti-Platonists, between "the open society" and "its enemies" (to borrow Professor Karl Popper's phrase), continues unabated down to the present day.
Nevertheless, this reviewer finds the general line of this argument persuasive
and believes with Catlin that abundant evidence exists in human history to
sustain this view.
In one most important aspect, unfortunately, Systematic Politics fails to live
up to its promise. The most pressing task of political theory in the midtwentieth
century is to take adequate account not only of universals which were first
expounded systematically 2,500 years ago, but of the unique social circumstances
under which we live at the present time -and
to build a bridge of relevance
between the universals and the specific social context of today. These special
circumstances are to be found in the fact that ours is an age of rapid, incessant
movement specifically marked by population explosion, an extreme complexity
of economic and social organization, and above all an unprecedented velocity
of technologically conditioned change-visible within the lifetime of individuals
in the foundations of individual and social existence. It remains to be demonstrated that man, an essentially conservative animal, can work out an accommodation to this markedly unsettling social environment without sacrificing his
last ties to the civilized values inherent in the Great Tradition of which Catlin
speaks.
It may be said - perhaps with much truth - that we are faced today with
the challenge which faced the builders of the Tower of Babel, and that we may
expect their fate. But unless we choose to adopt this hopeless view, we have no
choice but to think and act with this unprecedented social instability as the
basic reality of our lives in the secular world. This involves, among other things,
changing our intellectual stance so that we may ask relevant and constructive
questions of our contemporary environment. An aggiornamento is clearly required
not only of the churches but of the social sciences as well. Neither the basic truths
of classical political philosophy nor the vital significance of natural law has been
essentially diminished in our generation. But their formal statement in traditional form often appears glaringly irrelevant to the challenges of the present.
Despite his sociological consciousness and the fertility of some of his insights,
Gatlin has chosen to write an essentially traditionalist synthesis of political knowledge. It is a work which, with all of its author's awareness of contemporary social
thought, remains surprisingly static - a work which tends to discuss such classic
concerns of political science as freedom and authority, despite appearances, in
a social vacuum. The author, therefore, tends at times to miss the point aimed
at by the thinkers to whom he refers so voluminously.
One thinks at once, for example, of his references to Marxism and his general discussion of "freedom." It is, of course, quite true that Marx himself was
"too good a capitalist," rather closely mirroring the aggressiveness and selfassertiveness of his own day. Pope Pius XI was also entirely right when he
asserted in Quadragesimo Anno that Marxist Socialism was the child of the
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atomistic, anticommunitarian political culture of the capitalist Liberalism which
immediately preceded it. But to say this -or to reiterate the obvious truth that
power struggles and, hence, politics would continue, contra Marx, under any
mode of social organization- bypasses the significant contribution to the understanding of society which the Marxists have made.
Two aspects of this contribution are of immediate concern: the awareness
of the social relativity of manifestations and definitions of freedom which have
tended elsewhere to be regarded as absolutes, and the awareness of the devastating consequences of uncontrolled industrialization upon individual men and
their communities. Whether most of us choose to acknowledge this debt or not,
the Marxists were among the first fully to recognize that unless certain material
minimum standards of life were reached by the individual, the life which he
led could not be called fully human. Today this awareness has become virtually
a commonplace, but its implications for freedom and other cardinal preoccupations of political theory have by no means been fully explored. This Marxist
tradition-and non-Marxist social scientists who have picked up these insights
-insists
upon the importance of making discussions of freedom contingent
upon the concrete socioeconomic context rather than upon abstract models
of theoretical governmental forms.
Of course, the Marxists have not been alone in their recognition of this
relativity of certain forms of individual freedom. Nor have they been the only
school of social thought to perceive and seek understanding of the unique capacity of modem industrialization ruthlessly to destroy all preceding forms of human
community, and its equally glaring failure to provide a humanly satisfying
substitute for these destroyed communities. Great papal encyclicals, such as
Quadragesimo Anno and Pacem in Terris; the works of men like Freud, Herbert
Marcuse (Eros and Civilization, 1955), and Erich Fromm (The Sane Society,
1955), who start from essentially psychoanalytic premises; and works by Christian Socialists, Christian Democrats and Fabian, non-Marxist socialists, all have
shared this same vision. The end product of the developments described is our
contemporary phenomenon, mass society-a society composed of individuals
who are atomized; subject to mobilization and manipulation by the powerful;
and additionally, if they belong to underdeveloped strata within the Western
metropole, or to underdeveloped countries outside it, subject to rapacious
exploitation by organized entities too large for them to comprehend and hence
condemned to an existence which is markedly less than human.
Why do masses of people in the modem world seem to choose what the more
physically and psychologically comfortable in the West call unfreedom? Is not
one answer - in addition to Catlin's - that they do so because the traditional
definitions, rhetoric and institutional practices of representative democracy
become irrelevant when man lives in a society in which he is supremely vulnerable to irresponsible, impersonal forces which he cannot control? In any
event, perverse and distorted though we may believe their concepts of man
and his higher destiny to be, the Marxists have been virtually the only school
of secular thinkers to organize their social and political thought around the
reality of permanent, technologically conditioned revolution; and, reflecting the
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progressive, optimistic wing of Western political thought, they have been among
the very few to insist that the titanic forces unleashed by this ongoing revolution can be rationally controlled and shaped toward humane ends. It is what
might be called the psychological relevance of this philosophy which, far
more than the merits of its economic analysis, has contributed to its rapid
spread among the dispossessed classes and nations of the postwar world. To
the extent that it has stressed the importance of socioeconomic limits upon
freedom, and above all to the extent that it has recognized the absolute necessity of genuine community, it may even be argued that it has incorporated basic
principles of Catlin's natural law into its world view. In view of all this, it is
unfortunate that Catlin's discussion dealt so little with these central insights.
What is needed is a reordering of the dialogue along lines which fully incorporate our permanent revolution as the primary frame of social reference. We need
to ask questions such as the following. What are the constraints which current
modes of social and economic organization place upon individual freedom? To
what extent, if any, does the development of these modes of organization make
irrelevant, or even repressive, definitions and institutionalized practices of freedom developed in an earlier and less complex age? (Catlin does discuss this,
but only in the context of his no doubt sound view that the nation-state has
become obsolescent and dangerous.) What general theoretical orientations and
concrete steps should be taken by the polity at large to minimize the socially
disruptive effects of technologically forced change and also to maximize the
chances that rational control over this change may be secured or maintained?
Recognizing that our age is de facto collectivist in its organizational structure
and cannot be otherwise in view of the necessary complexity and interdepenwhat means can we continue under such difficult condence of social life -by
ditions to protect individuality and to transmit the great tradition of the good
society?
These are, of course, extremely difficult questions, and they by no means
exhaust the list. So hard are they, indeed, that it is only too easy for scholars
and savants (often pleading the specialization which comes from an ever-finer
division of academic labor) either to take refuge in a traditional restatement
of essentials or in a culturally impoverished behaviorism which rigidly excludes
all questions involving value judgments. Catlin has produced an impressive
attempt to provide a bridge across this chasm. But his basically traditionalist
perspective is such as to make Systematic Politics only partially useful to the
bridgebuilders of the future. Effective integration, not only in the realm of
political theory but in the practical world of political power and political community, is needed if we are to have much chance of reconciling technological
imperatives and civilized values. Without it, as the experience of this century
in both the Western and non-Western worlds abundantly demonstrates, we shall
one day be confronted with a "theory" which is a monolithic social ideology
justifying someone's claims to absolute power, and with a "community" which
is the pseudocommunity imposed by some latter-day version of Big Brother.
WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
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ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS. By Samuel I. Shuman. Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1963. Pp. vi, 265. $8.50.

PosrrIvIsM:

In this book Professor Shuman has applied himself to an inquiry the desirability of which one can enthusiastically commend, though it may be felt that
the project was somewhat overambitious for a work of this size. A listing of the
chapter headings will give a glimpse of the dimensions of the task: The Identification of Discernibles; Why Legal Theories; Ethics and Obligation; Legal and
Moral Response to Purposive Conduct; The Is-Ought Dichotomy; Legal Positivism and the Morality of Law; Ultimate Goals, The Nature of Man and
Science; The Politics of Philosophy. One who will attempt to dispose of these
questions in a good deal less than three hundred pages must at the least not lack
confidence.
Right at the outset the reader of this book is confronted by one curious
circumstance. This is that in a book the theme of which is legal positivism,
Shuman advances a stipulative definition of legal positivism in rather unorthodox terms. If a common law student of jurisprudence were asked to point to
the model of the positivist jurist par excellence, there can be little doubt that
he would invoke the name of Austin. But Shuman tells us, "Neither Austin's
'system' nor Austin's philosophic outlook was positivistic." (p. 11) The reason
advanced for this characterization is that Austin advocated that students in his
ideal law school would receive instruction in the law that ought to be. (p. 11)
If an interest in what the law ought to be disqualifies one from being a positivist,
then there are almost certainly no positivist jurists and Shuman's book need not
have been written. A few pages later we come to a more affirmative statement
of Shuman's views of the criteria that must be satisfied before he will admit a
jurist to the title of positivist. He tells us that a legal positivist is one who "II
(a) Maintains that law and morals are separate, and II (b) Maintains a certain
view as to the nature of morals." (p. 15)
The certain view as to the nature of morals that must be held is one that
is described as "some form of noncognitivism." (p. 15) Shuman tells us that "it
is perhaps fair to advise the reader that distinctions here proposed are recognized as other than those which are thought of as being characteristic and also
unlike those which traditionally appear in the literature." (p. 12) This is a
reasonable warning that we are about to meet an unusual elucidation of the
term "positivism," but it is somewhat marred by the author's assertion three
pages later that "contrary to generally prevailing views the test for legal positivism
involves. . .

."

(p. 15)

This sounds like a suggestion of one proper meaning for

"positivism" and is an odd statement by a writer who is as familiar as is Shuman
with the linguistic sophistication of contemporary philosophy.
The whole business of classifying jurists in or outside the positivist pigeonhole is perhaps now becoming rather ludicrous. For Shuman, Austin is no positivist because he subscribed to the general utilitarian ethic, but Kelsen is very
much of a positivist because he takes up a noncognitivist position on ethics.
Shuman also seems to accept Alf Ross as a positivist for the same reason. Now
Ross has recently told us that Kelsen is no more than a quasi-positivist, for the
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reason that Ross finds in Kelsen's doctrine of the basic norm an ethical principle
enjoining obedience to the law.1 Professor Friedmann complicates things further
by telling us that Kelsen is "anti-empiricist but not anti-positivist."

2

It is all

rather reminiscent of Leopold I's famous retort, on being told that he was
King of the Belgians: "There are no Belgians." Whether there are really any
positivists or not, it would certainly be a good deal healthier to devote more
attention to discussing what individual jurists have said than to debate endlessly about how they are to be docketed in one's private museum.
But there remain two criticisms of Shuman's whole approach in this book
that emerge from this introductory point. In the first place it is an odd procedure to employ the term "Legal Positivism" on one's title page and then to
adopt a meaning of positivism that is much narrower than the usual jurisprudential meanings. In the second place this is particularly unjustifiable since
Shuman has made no very serious attempt to canvass at the outset .the variety
of possible meanings that cluster around the phrase "legal positivism." In a
book in which he is constantly inviting us to regress further and further to
question and elucidate the terms that we employ in asking our questions he
devotes no more than six pages to this extremely important initial question.
Professor H. L. A. Hart has suggested five possible meanings of positivism in
a jurisprudential context:
(1) That laws are commands of human beings; (2) that there is no necessary connection between law and morals, or law as it is and law as it ought
to be; (3) that the analysis or study of meanings of legal concepts is an
important study to be distinguished from (though in no way hostile to)
historical inquiries, sociological inquiries, and the critical appraisal of law in
terms of morals, social aims, functions etc.; (4) that a legal system is a
"closed logical system" in which correct decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means alone; (5) that moral judgments
cannot be established, as statements of fact can, by rational argument, evidence or proof ("noncognitivism in ethics").3
Shuman briefly notes this set of possible meanings suggested by Hart but does
not carry the inquiry much further. He has apparently not noticed at all the
very important discussion of the legal positivist tradition by Ago. Ago's article
contains a careful and learned tracing of the history of the term "positive law"
and of the term "positivism" as applied in jurisprudence which we could
reasonably have expected Shuman in a book of this kind to have taken into
account.

4

A graver objection is that there is in the whole of this book remarkably
little detailed discussion of the views even of those few jurists whom Shuman
is willing to characterize as positivists. It is difficult to see how a book can be
1.

All Ross, Validity and the Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, 1961
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2.
W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 112 (3rd ed., 1953).
3. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW 593, 601 n. 25 (1958).
4.
Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 691 (1957).
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thought to have dealt adequately with the scope and limitations of positivism
if there is no serious attempt to arrive at general estimates of the contributions
of writers such as Kelsen, Ross, and Hart. Of these three jurists Kelsen is
accorded the better part of one chapter in Shuman's book, and this chapter
contains a useful discussion of Kelsen's general philosophical background. Shuman
does touch here upon that most difficult of Kelsen's concepts, the notion of the
basic norm, but he does not get to grips with some of the features of that concept which one would have thought most interesting in the context of the theme
of his book. He does tell us, in passing as it were, that Kelsen is guilty of "an
incredible confusion as to the notion of validity." (p. 20; see also p. 203) Now,
if a jurist of Kelsen's general subtlety and profundity is guilty of some heinous
philosophical crime (which may well be the case), then the reader ought to
have it spelled out for him; but a reading of this book does not serve to make
it clear what that crime might be.
What is perhaps in Shuman's mind is the point that Ross has raised about
the character of Kelsen's concept of the basic norm. 5 The argument runs something like this. Kelsen expresses his basic norm to be a proposition that the will
of the original constitution makers (the founding fathers) ought to be obeyed. 6
This norm by definition cannot be valid in the sense that a particular norm of
the law can be valid, for the validity of a particular norm of the law is meaningful in the sense that there is a superior norm standing above it and from which
it is derived (at least procedurally), while the very essence of the basic norm
is that there is no norm standing above it. If the basic norm imposes a "duty
to obey the law" we must ask what can be meant by a duty to obey the law
over and above a duty to fulfill the demands of a particular legal prescription.
In a legal context we know what we mean when we say "X has a duty to pay
Y $1,000." What would we add to this if we said "X has a duty to do his
duty to pay Y $1,000"? There might of course be a general constitutional or
statutory provision in a particular legal system to the effect that there is a
general duty to obey the law, but it is difficult to see how this would add anything of significance to the individual prescriptions of the system. If there were
such a general provision, then in the statement "X has a duty to do his duty
to pay Y $1,000," both uses of duty would refer or might refer to a legal duty.
But this would verge on surplusage. To accord any importance to such a statement we shall have to say that the first sense of the word "duty" is quite unlike
the second sense, that the first sense does not refer to a legal duty and must
therefore refer to a moral duty. But since, for Kelsen, a system of norms constitutes a legal system when it is generally effective, we now arrive at the position
that there is a moral duty to comply with the prescriptions of a generally effective
system of coercive prescriptions. It is in this kind of thinking that we may
legitimately perceive the more sinister implications of the slogan Gesetz ist
Gesetz. But, as Ross points out, if we can fairly read this into Kelsen's scheme
of things, then the encouragement to totalitarian regimes begins precisely where
Kelsen ceases to be a positivist, precisely where he introduces a colossal natural
5.

Op. cit. supra note 1, at 62-64.

6.

HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY Op LAW AND STATE 115 (1944).
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law idea - that there is a moral duty to comply with the norms of a generally
effective system of coercive norms.
Kelsen would assuredly repudiate any such view of his theory of law. His
answer would probably be that the "ought" contained in his statement of the
basic norm does not imply a moral duty at all. But Kelsen's whole exposition of
the sense in which he uses "ought" is hazy and raises problems. It will be remembered that in Kelsen's view, the ought in the legal norm is addressed to officials.
The notion of duty imposed on the public at large is for him a secondary
construct. He makes it plain that the official organ which ought to execute
the sanction is not to be considered as under a duty unless there is a further
norm applying a sanction to the official organ if it has failed to execute the
original sanction. As far as the primary addressee (the official organ) is concerned, the "ought" of a legal norm does not indicate a duty. "The word
'ought' only denotes the specific sense in which the sanction is stipulated, provided, determined in the norm." 7 And so Kelsen would presumably say of the
basic norm. It should not be taken as imposing a duty at all. But the whole idea
of an ought proposition that does not impose a duty is a curious one (unless
we understand it as referring to a causal connection which is clearly not Kelsen's
intention) and, together with his vacillations in his formulation of the basic
norm, is one of the primary weaknesses in Kelsen's system.8
On the other hand, if we are concerned with the contribution of the positivist tradition to the battle against totalitarian political structures, we must
surely take careful note of Kelsen's theory of the nature of the state. 9 In his
demonstration that the concept of the state is but a concept of the legal order
viewed from a certain angle, in his argument that any talk of the primacy of
the state over law is but disguised ideology, Kelsen has surely rendered a great
service and valuable ammunition to those who wish to challenge the mystical
propositions of totalitarian political theory. One is at a loss to see how these
issues can be left undiscussed in a book which professes to take as one of its
central themes the connection between legal positivism and forms of government.
If we turn to the work of Hart, it is true that Shuman's book was written
before Hart's The Concept of Law had appeared. But enough issues were raised
in Hart's earlier writings to have formed a necessary subject of discussion in
a book on legal positivism. Hart, for example, has sought to avoid the thorny
issues raised by Kelsen's doctrine of the basic norm by substituting for it the
notion of acceptance of basic rules of recognition.10 According to this view we
should not conceive of the basis of a legal system as a duty at all but rather
as a set of criteria which are in fact used by officials and others for identifying
valid law. In this way the statement of the rule of recognition in a particular
society is the product of an empirical investigation of behavior in that society.
This in turn leaves this reviewer with some puzzles which he would have ex7.

Id. at 60.

8. See Julius Stone, Mystery and Mystique in the Basic Norm, 26 MODERN LAW REVIEW
34 (1963).
9. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 182-388.
10. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Melden ed.,
1958) and HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-120 (1961).
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pected Shuman at least to note in the course of his book. If the "rule of recognition" can be reduced to observation of regularities on the part of officials and
perhaps of citizens at large, in what sense is it a "rule" at all? Hart's answer
would perhaps be that it is a rule because it is more than a mere observable
regularity of behavior; officials consciously regulate their conduct in its light
and make it a basis for criticizing others, etc. This is the "internal" point of view.
But at the same time Hart classifies the rule of recognition not as a duty
imposing rule (a "primary" one in his lexicon) but as a power conferring rule
(a "secondary" one).11 However, it is very difficult to see that the rule of
recognition is the same kind of rule as the rule which empowers me to make
a will by prescribing the correct procedure that I must follow if I wish to
achieve a certain result. The rule of recognition does not say to officials, "If
you want X you must do Y." If we are to think of it as a rule at all it seems
rather to say, "This is what you must do," and in that sense to be much closer
to rules that impose duties. But the meaningfulness of the "must" here is in the
fact that this is the way in which officials do behave in the given society and
therefore would seem to lead us back to the proposition that valid law consists
of those rules which do strike a certain response from officials. Hart's rule of
recognition is a generalization based on observation of past official response and
prediction of future official response which makes it more and more strained
to see it as a power conferring rule or indeed as a rule at all. This is not to
fall into the old realist exaggeration of saying that law is what officials do. It
is to say, rather, that the criteria for identifying valid law in a modem state
are statements about community patterns of behavior and are therefore empirical
descriptive statements.
Professor Hart comes close to acknowledging this but clouds the issue by
talking about the "acceptance" of rules of recognition. The whole notion of
"accepting" rules is an important one in Hart's scheme but it is one that is not
free from obscurity. 12 What do I do when I accept a rule? Do I accept the
rule that creates a crime of murder by not committing murders? Do I not accept
it if I commit a murder? Do I accept a rule imposing a speed limit of fifty
miles per hour if I say that I consider that it is unreasonable, but that I will
comply with it because I am afraid of being prosecuted? if I say that it is
unreasonable but that I will comply with it because I recognize an overriding
interest in general compliance with rules of law? if I say that, although I
recognize it as a properly enacted law, I will not comply with it because it is
so unreasonable? We can agree with Hart that a rule of law may impose an
obligation on me even though I do not feel bound by it. But do I accept it if
I do not feel bound by it? and how exactly must I feel bound by it to accept it,
if feeling bound in some sense is a part of the notion of acceptance? Hart might
reply that the notion of acceptance is not a part of his analysis of the existence
of a primary rule of obligation but is only relevant to his concept of a funda11.
12.
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mental rule of recognition. But this would not dissipate the difficulty. For what
are we saying about official behavior when we say that officials accept rules of
recognition? If we are referring to legislators what can we mean other than
that they do as a matter of fact go about their business in a certain way and
that they have a certain feeling that this is the only proper way of doing things?
If we are speaking of judges what can we mean other than that they do as a
matter of fact locate the rules that they apply in a certain way and that they
have a feeling that this is the only proper way? It may be helpful here to turn
to the analogy of games which is so fashionable a reference in philosophy from
Wittgenstein onwards. If we are interested in isolating for purposes of study a
particular game such as baseball or chess, it will be necessary to employ the
notion of different rules of recognition in baseball and chess in order to differentiate the different rules of the different games. Similarly with law the notion
of rules of recognition will be useful if our main concern is to know in what
sense the law of the United States is not the law of Mexico. If our principal
interest were rather in the concept of "game" in general then we should surely
need to speak in broader terms of a kind of human activity directed to certain
ends. We should need to include the notions of competition, diversion, spectacle,
etc., which are not expressed by the concept of rules and nothing more. And
if our principal interest is in the general notion of "legal system" we shall need
to have broader "key" concepts than the concept of rules.
In this vein a recent commentator has perceptively noticed a tendency to
reductionism in Hart's legal philosophy.' 3 It may indeed not be possible to
construct an adequate picture of a legal system without taking account of the
concept of a rule. The American realists were almost certainly mistaken if they
thought this could be done. But it may be equally mistaken to seize in a monocular fashion upon the notion of rule or norm, as both Kelsen and Hart do,
as the "essence" of a legal system. If one starts with the very simplified but
probably generally acceptable observation that in a primitive society law and
morality are (from the standpoint of our hindsight) much confused with each
other, then we may say that one of the tasks of the jurist is to show how in
modern societies it is possible to make a sharp distinction between moral rules
and legal rules. Two key ideas to assist in this task will be the ideas of "process"
and "institution." We have a legal system when we have articulated organs and
procedures for making rules, for adjudicating disputes, and for applying coercive
sanctions. We must therefore give prominence to such concepts as legislatures,
courts, police forces, legislative processes, judicial processes, and law-enforcement
processes. The question then becomes whether such institutions and processes
can be fully elucidated and satisfactorily understood by reducing them to pyramids of rules. Historically it would seem that basic rules of recognition are often
the product of the continuing activities of these institutions, and in this sense
it is certainly misleading to explain these phenomena as being rooted in the
acceptance of rules of recognition. To gain an insight into the nature of legal
systems we would be more gainfully employed in investigating how in fact
13. Robert S. Summers, Professor H. L. A. Hart's THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 1963 DUKE
LAW JOURNAL 629, 640-645.
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people have collaborated and do collaborate for the solution of disputes. This
might well show that the special characteristics of the standard uses of the
words "law" and "legal system" involve very centrally the ideas of institutions
proceeding according to certain techniques of reasoning and action, ideas which
are not adequately explained by the concept of rule alone.
If Shuman does not grapple with some of the most central and obscure
concepts of Hart's jurisprudence, he makes no attempt at all to appraise the
work of Alf Ross. Indeed if we turn to the name index at the end of the book
we find that the only Ross who appears there is a "Ross, Sir. W. David." It is
very difficult to understand this omission, especially since Alf Ross would seem
to fit Shuman's own restricted definition of a positivist jurist. This review is no
place to embark on a general discussion of the importance of Ross, but it may
be proper to indicate briefly one reason why no general discussion of positivist
thought can be complete without an appraisal of his position. If there is a
major division in positivist writing it is between those jurists who define valid
law in terms of derivation from a basic rule and those who define it in terms
of the response of people to particular rules. Both Kelsen and Hart are of
course in the first camp; the most articulate exponent of the other viewpoint
is Ross. The question is by no means academic, for it involves a clear difference
of opinion about whether a proffered rule can in certain circumstances be
regarded as law or not. If there is a penal offense of fornication on the statute
book but no prosecuting official has invoked this rule for a century while sociological studies reveal a high incidence of easily detectable fornication in that
society, is there a legal duty not to commit fornication in that society? Presumably Hart and Kelsen would both say yes, while Ross would say no. The
matter might seem to depend on the nature of the particular legal system, for
some systems have a doctrine of desuetudo, whereas common law systems generally do not. Kelsen and Hart might of course retort that their position would
hold good even in a system which operated a doctrine of desuetudo, for all
that one would need to do would be to revise one's formulation of the basic
norm or basic rules of recognition in that society to incorporate the element of
desuetudo. So one might then say that valid law in that society comprises all
rules made in compliance with basic rules of recognition, X, Y, and Z, except
rules made in this manner which have not been enforced for more than a
century. But to do this would of course only be to recognize the response of
officials to particular rules as a vital element in the basic rule of recognition
and lead us back to the question posed earlier in this review of how helpful
it then is to talk at all in terms of "accepting rules." One of the many significant
features of Ross's analysis is that it serves to lead us to this inquiry.
This review has been occupied this far with suggesting that Shuman's book
ignores so many of the central issues in positivist writing that it cannot be
accepted as an adequate fulfillment of the promise held out in its title. There
are places in the book where Shuman seems to be approaching a discussion of
some of these questions but he always veers off before he really comes to grips
with them. His book is principally a discussion of noncognitivism in ethics as a
general philosophic position with some reference to the impact of this position
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on legal philosophy. As a writer on this theme Shuman displays close familiarity
with most of the important recent philosophical writing. From the writings
cited in his notes there could be compiled a most useful bibliography in this
area. This reviewer is certainly not competent to pass judgment on topics that
so excite professional philosophers. But perhaps the comment may be ventured
that if clarity of style in an author is very much needed to guide the amateur
in philosophy through these thickets, such a reader may not find Shuman's book
very helpful. Large tracts of this book read like a densely packed summary and
critique of the contents of the most prominent philosophical journals in the last
decade or so. In the face of this kind of writing this reviewer is always very
ready to incline to the humble position that his lack of enlightenment is due
to his own slow-wittedness, but the suspicion hopefully intrudes that perhaps the
author of the book is at least in part to blame.
GRAHAM HUGHES

MORALITY AND THE LANGUAGE OF CONDUCT. Edited by Hector-Neri Castafieda

and George Nakhnikian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963.
Pp. viii, 367. $9.75.
The nine essays in this volume were written by American philosophers, and,
with the exception of the essays by Aiken and Sellars, they appear in print here
for the first time. The range of topics includes the nature of morality itself, the
relation of utility to right action, the relation of oughts to imperatives, and the
nature of motivation by duty. In many of the essays there is, at various levels
of explicitness, critical commentary on the ethical theories of the past fifteen
years. The work of the English moralists R. M. Hare, S. E. Toulmin, and P. H.
Nowell-Smith bulks large in the background. Yet the critical commentary is a
propaedeutic for positive suggestions. The least common denominator of these
suggestions can be labeled ethical objectivism. It is in any event something
which contrasts with the earlier imperativist and resolutivist theories. Frankena
rejects the idea that a moral disagreement could be a de gustibus one; Aiken
finds objectionable a moral autonomism which makes agents laws unto themselves; Brandt puts the rule productive of utility before the rule merely accepted
by the group; and Sellars finds that a moral disagreement is reducible to one
about matters of fact, not to one about personal intentions. The influence of
linguistic analysis is evident in the contributors' methods of attacking problems.
In this regard there is considerable fence straddling; linguistic analysis is felt
to be important but not always sufficient. It is not said, however, from what
quarter one is to look for help when one has reached the end of one's linguistic
tether. In all, this volume represents an attempt to accommodate ethical theory
to what remains of the framework of assumptions and methods advanced at
midcentury.
In the opening essay, "Recent Conceptions of Morality," William K. Frankena
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discusses moral judgments. By a moral judgment he means one which attempts
to settle a question of morality, and thus for him a judgment is not moral just
when it is itself good or legitimate. The judgment that gold is heavier than
iron is nonmoral. The status of your judgment that you owe yourself a vacation
every summer would be decided differently under differing conceptions of morality. Frankena distinguishes a formal and a material concept of morality. One
kind of formalist would say that a judgment is moral if it is a personal decision
for which one claims intersubjective validity. The element of personal autonomy
in regard to the making of the judgment is all important. On one kind of material
view of morality, it would be said that for a judgment to be moral it must be
made for the purpose of advancing the social good. Personal autonomy together
with a claim of intersubjective validity is not enough. On the material view,
being moral in outlook involves having a social concern; on the formal view,
a moral outlook is compatible with both selfishness and selflessness. The judgment
that you owe yourself a vacation every summer could be moral only for the
formalist. Frankena comments that each view can be advocated in two ways.
It can be advocated either as the correct description of the word "moral" or,
rejecting current usage, as the best recommendation for its use. These distinctions
provide a matrix for the discussion of the essays by Falk and Aiken.
W. D. Falk, in "Morality, Self, and Others," argues convincingly that commitments to oneself can be as binding as those to others. But, he asks, can
commitments to oneself, as opposed to social commitments, be called moral,
rather than merely prudential? Both the formalist and the nonformalist have
strong arguments from usage. The expressions "moral freedom" and "moral
strength" suggest the legitimacy of calling a personal ought a moral ought.
Yet, Falk claims, the expression "morally good man" connects with "selfless man,"
and thus favors the material conception of morality. It is then to strain the usual
associations of language to the limit either to affirm or to deny that no commitment to put one's own good before that of another is moral. Falk refrains
from resolving by a recommendation for future usage the issue left indeterminate
by present usage. Yet Falk's documentation of the supposed linguistic strain
implied by saying either yes or no is too skimpy. It is insufficient for his case to
point out that "morally good man" connects with "selfless man," for it also
connects with "man of conscience," and it is admitted that the personal ought
can be as binding in conscience as the social one. It is not then shown conclusively that one cannot call both "I owe it to myself to X" and "I owe it to
another to X" moral without linguistic strain.
In "The Concept of Moral Objectivity" H. D. Aiken sets out to analyze
the concept of moral objectivity and ends by advocating the moral principlethe principle of moral objectivity- that we scrutinize our decisions in the light
of facts and commitments. But this passage from description to recommendation is consistent with his remark that in philosophy no question about the
meaning of a word is purely irenic. For Aiken, objectivity in morals is not to
be equated with the existence of universal and necessary principles in terms of
which every disagreement can be resolved. For it is doubtful that there are such
principles. Rather, in morals, objectivity is a feature of particular judgments
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which have survived the test of criticism in the face of all of our moral commitments. An objective judgment is one which coheres in a moral system.
Judgments leading to contradictory actions can, when made in different moral
communities, both be morally true. A thoroughgoing system of moral evil would,
for Aiken, be a contradiction in terms. Thus to the extent that murder has been
made into a system by some groups in our midst, it would, to that extent, have
to be allowed that "We ought to do away with Officer O'Reilly" can be morally
true. One would have welcomed some indication from Aiken as to how to avoid
such an intolerable result.
The utilitarian principle proposed by Richard B. Brandt in his "Toward
a Credible Utilitarianism" attempts to avoid the utopian character of some
forms of utilitarianism by recognizing the demands both of utility and of current
social acceptance of possibly nonutilitarian norms. If the criterion for rightness
is conformity to rules which, if adopted by everyone, would maximize utility,
then a right act could be harmful when performed in a context in which not
everyone agreed to those rules. Thus Brandt proposes that an act is right when
it conforms to rules which, if adopted by everyone except those of already fixed
moral convictions, would maximize utility. But this proposal leads to a dilemma
over the question of rightness for one of fixed moral convictions, when those
convictions differ from the rules mentioned in the proposal and could replace
those rules only at the expense of utility. If such a person acts on rules which,
when acted on by all but some including himself, maximize utility, then he
prevents the maximization of utility. If he does not act on rules which, when
acted on by all but some including himself, maximize utility, then he does what
is wrong. Hence, he either prevents the maximization of utility or does what is
wrong each time he acts.
Whereas Brandt recommends a criterion for rightness, Nakhnikian, Sellars,
and Castafieda move closer to the analytic task of describing the usage of ethical
and related terms. "On the Naturalistic Fallacy," by George Nakhnikian, revisits
G. E. Moore's PrincipiaEthica, and, among other things, concludes with Moore
that an evaluative assertion cannot be made with a sentence containing ethical
terms if that sentence is analytic. One does not make an evaluation when one
asserts the analytic sentence "All good things are good." There is no evaluation
since one is already present in identifying good things and will then not be
repeated by the addition of the predicate. But from examples like this it is
doubtful that Nakhnikian's general conclusion follows. Anyone who would deny
the sentence "Taking an infant from its mother and removing its eyes, tongue,
feet, and hands is wrong" would surely be making a conceptual blunder. Hence
the sentence is, in at least one important sense, analytic. Nonetheless, it can be
used in making an evaluation. It will not do to reply that, since a moral monster
might not think it wrong to mutilate innocents, the denial of our sentence is
consistently thinkable. For it would not be claimed that, because a schizophrenic
thinks himself his own father, the sentence "Nobody is father to himself" is not
analytic.
Wilfrid Sellars, in "Imperatives, Intentions, and the Logic of 'Ought,'" and
Hector-Neri Castafieda, in "Imperatives, Decisions, and 'Oughts': A Logico-
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Metaphysical Investigation," provide analyses of "X ought to do A," intended
to avoid the difficulties of Hare's analysis. Implicitly, Castafieda's essay undercuts Sellars'. Castafieda argues successfully the point that resolves cannot occur
in the subordinate clauses of conditionals. The main clause of "I shall do A if
p" is a resolve, but the subordinate clause (i.e., the antecedent) of "If I shall do
A then p" does not express a resolve. But for Sellars oughts are in part resolves.
He holds that "X ought in circumstances C to do A" means the same as "We
the group are resolved that X do A because X is in C and it is a first principle of
moral reasoning that we are resolved that X do A if X is in C." Since this becausesentence contains the resolutive "We the group are resolved that X do A," oughts
are taken to be in part resolves. But, as Castafieda points out, an ought can,
whereas a resolve cannot, occur as a subordinate clause in a conditional. Thus
we can have "A is possible if X ought to do A," but the subordinate clause of
"The question is settled if we are resolved that X do A," though it uses the word
"resolved," is not a resolve. Thus, for Castafieda, it will not do to claim that
oughts are in part resolves; oughts can be expressed in places in sentences where
resolves cannot be made. This criticism is sound if "ought" has the same meaning
in both "X ought to do A" and "p if X ought to do A."
Castafieda himself holds that "X ought to do A" implies and is implied by
the metalinguistic claim "The imperative 'X, do A!' is justified," where justification is relative to the ends, facts, and conventions of the case. This shift to the
metalanguage is designed to circumvent criticism of the sort just given of Sellars'
view and applicable to any view holding that oughts are in whole or in part
imperatives or resolutives. Since, for Castafieda, such metalinguistic claims have
the same practical function as normative claims, normative discourse is superfluous. Yet this analysis seems to run up against the fact that there can be duties
where imperatives are unjustified. Gentle persuasion, not raw imperative, is
needed in bringing many people around to their duty. John's overly sensitive son,
Peter, ought to tell the truth, and so "Peter ought to tell the truth" is true. But
John's telling Peter to tell the truth will only force Peter into deeper conflict with
the ideal of family harmony, and so "The imperative 'Peter, tell the truth!' is
justified" is false. The claimed equivalence is then upset. Moreover, though
undiplomatic, the second person directive "You ought to tell the truth," issued
by John to Peter, will be true, and Castafieda's metalinguistic counterpart "The
imperative 'Peter, tell the truth!' is justified" will again be false.
The last two essays discussed complement one another in a helpful way and
can be admired for their systematic thoroughness. Further, Castafieda's critique
of the (nonmetalinguistic) imperativist, resolutivist, and good-reasons approaches
to "ought" provides an excellent tract on fallacies in recent ethical theory. And
Sellars' essay contains the challenging denial that there is such a thing as imperative inference. One is inclined to agree with Sellars that it would be odd to
reason "Get inside if it rains! But it is raining. So get inside!" But there is nothing
odd about "It is raining. So get inside!" Thus, though there may well be no
inferences from imperatives to imperatives, there are imperative inferences in
that there are inferences from nonimperatives to imperatives. If "It is raining. So
get inside!" were claimed to be incomplete, as Hare would claim it is, the needed
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premise would be the nonimperative "You should get inside if it rains," rather
than the imperative "Get inside if it rains!" Over all, Sellars' essay is brilliant
and bewildering. A first reading may not reveal its coherence and the insights
deepened by its many logical reminders. But it is likely to commit one to a quest
for them. These features are not new to the exasperated but persevering readers
of the epistemological Sellars.
To come to the main point of his essay "The Desire to Do One's Duty for
Its Own Sake," John Ladd distinguishes desires from motives. He points out that,
whereas motives can be used to justify as well as to explain actions, desires can
be used only to explain them. Motives but not desires are answers to questions
of the form "Why should X do A?" He agrees with H. A. Prichard and A. C.
Ewing that the thought that A is a duty can function as a motive for doing A,
and hence as a reason for doing A and also as a reason for wanting to do A.
But, he asks, doesn't it follow that duty's being a motive involves having a desire
to do one's duty for its own sake? For, if the thought that A is one's duty motivates
one's doing A, then it makes one want to do A, i.e., makes one desire to do
one's duty, A, for no other reason or motive than that it is one's duty. Yet Ladd
answers this question negatively, after having distinguished formal from material
reasons. If I say that I am frightened by X because X is frightening, I am
giving a formal reason; if I say that I am frightened by X because X has long
teeth, I am giving a material reason. But formal reasons are empty, in that in
justifying them we have to turn to the corresponding material reasons. Why is
X frightening? Because X has long teeth.
Now duty, claims Ladd, is only a formal reason. To say that one does A
because A is one's duty is to give a formal reason, which will thus be justified
by the material reasons a, b, c. From this Ladd believes he can infer there is no
desire to do duty for its own sake. The supposed desire to do one's duty, A,
for no other reason than the formal one that A is one's duty disappears, and
in its place we have the desire to do one's duty, A, for the material reasons a, b, c.
But granting that duty is a formal reason, does it follow, as Ladd claims it does,
that duty for its own sake is unreal while duty for material reasons' sake is real?
Is Red Ridinghood's disliking Wolf for the reason that he is frightening unreal?
Is only her disliking Wolf for the reason that he has long teeth real? Surely not.
It follows from Ladd's premises only that a person who says he wanted to do
A because it was his duty could also say he wanted to do A because of a, b, c.
Saying the second would be compatible with saying the first since a, b, c are
equally reasons for A's being a duty and reasons for wanting to do A.
Our volume's concluding essay is Francis V. Raab's "The Relevance of Morals
to Our Denials of Responsibility." Raab considers it obvious that, if one is not
responsible for a deed, one ought not to be punished for it. Yet the truth of this
implication does not require that criteria for responsibility remain fixed through
time or be precise at a given time. Changing moral attitudes can change criteria
of responsibility, and present moral attitudes can influence responsibility claims
where according to recognized criteria of responsibility there are borderline cases.
Moral attitudes are then partial determinants of denials of responsibility in
difficult cases. This is understandable since a denial of responsibility is itself a
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moral ground for withholding punishment. Raab's view would be opposed to
one according to which responsibility or the lack of it is ascribed purely by
reference to descriptive regularities. If morals are relevant to responsibility, in
the way Raab claims, then the criteria of responsibility used by the law are
subject to review by the moralist.
There is a high level of philosophical argumentation running through all of
these essays. The critical spadework done in them should hasten the advent
of a new era in ethical theory. The lay philosopher interested in taking stock of
present American ethics will find all of these essays accessible to him, except the
extremely technical ones of Sellars and Castafieda.
MILTON FISK

By John Cogley, Robert M. Hutchins,
John Courtney Murray, S.J., Scott Buchanan, Philip Selznick, Harvey
Wheeler, Robert Gordis. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1963. Pp.
285. $4.00.

NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY.

Prepared for discussions on the natural law at the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, California, these papers represent a
high level of achievement of the aim of the Center: a community of scholars
investigating profoundly a subject not immediately the object of their competence and doing so with a stylistic grace that leaves their efforts accessible
to an educated public and with an analytic rigor that warrants the interest of
their academic fellows. The subject, moreover, is set in the contemporary problematic of rapidly evolving social and economic institutions where the use of
power seems inevitably to outdistance society's efforts to legitimize it. Since
these questions are far too important to leave to the experts alone, the views of
sociologists and political scientists are contrasted with those of a theologian
and a churchman. None is a specialist in jurisprudence; some, recognized as
"generalists," find themselves readily at home on an issue as close to the traditions
and culture of the West as the natural law.
The question whether or not natural law exists is not asked in any of the
papers, and no positivist or language analyst was invited to this "great conversation" at Santa Barbara. These authors generally agree that a new and
more accurate understanding of natural law exists today. In order to locate
their differences of viewpoint, a threefold division of natural law might be
useful. First, natural law can be considered operationally as actually effecting
order in legislation, the judiciary, the development of such institutions as the
family and the state. All the authors would grant that the reality designated
by the expression "natural law" is an objective source of intelligibility affording
society a bulwark against egoism, tyranny, expediency. It represents man's
belief that there is some consistency to human affairs against which the recurrent
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novelty of the present can be measured with certainty by good men who examine
their lives attentively and dispassionatciy" A second way of approaching the
phenomenon of natural law consists in constructing theories about how such
norms arise out of human experience. Here, positions in this book differ considerably, ranging from Hutchins' "reasoning back to nature" to Wheeler's opinion
that natural law is a protoscientific projection of the regularities of a going
social system into utopianized norms. A third set of questions would center on
the metaphysical or religious justification of the presence of some kind of natural
direction in human affairs. Each of the contributors maintains that natural
law, as a determinant of the shape of society, need not be associated with any
specific ultimate world view. Robert Gordis, however, comments pertinently on
the relation between natural law imperatives and the ultimate source of their
obligatory demands.
What strikes the reader immediately is that this book clears away a good
many stereotypes of what natural law is not. Natural law is not a code, though
always seeking formulation; not a statement made once at a particular moment
in history and then held forever valid, but always subject to the importunities
of the temporal unfolding of the human condition; not a vague aspiration, but
a workable set of criteria to which appeals are to be made in juridical procedure; not a statement of man's biophysical necessities, but the creative
interpretation of a developing human culture; not simply a conserving principle,
limiting and restraining, but a liberating force able to reform and reconstitute;
not self-evident or known intuitively as something "written in the heart," but
open to rational analysis and actualized in principled decision making.
In his introduction, John Cogley, after singling out some of the distortions
of the past and anticipating some of the contributions of the other essays, rightly
stresses a growing sensitivity toward the historical dimension of human nature,
with its attendant problem of just how to reconcile a principle of development
with one of constancy. "There is nothing wrong with the system that either an
exaggerated essentialism or a freewheeling existentialism can fix." (p. 25)
In his paper, "Natural Law and Public Consensus," John Courtney Murray,
S.J., introduces his carefully disciplined remarks by an admiring commentary on
Adolph A. Berle's Stafford Little lectures on the containment of economic power
through a "public consensus." He goes on to a more general treatment of the
process of natural law as a dialectic of experience and thought, always developing
new "operative imperatives" through the creative discoveries of "workers on
the margin" - the wise of the universities associated in discussion with responsible
journalists, political leaders, and, of course, members of the legal profession.
With careful distinctions and a feeling for the procedures of public affairs,
Murray emphasizes the historical character of natural law thinking. For him,
"man's free existence is a forward-looking historicity whose structure, which has
been conditioned by the historical past, is the matrix of projects for the future."
(p. 50) New situations, relations, institutions alter in a real sense the nature
of human existence, requiring new practical insights for the determination of an
orderly society. The minimum assumptions of natural law are nicely stressed:
man is intelligent, human experience is intelligible, and as derivative from the
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reality of human life, a set of natural law principles can be recognized as
obligatory. As civilization progresses, with a growing complexity of human conduct and multiplicity of institutions, more specialized experience and science
become necessary, however, for the development of more "remote" principles.
The consensus, or the natural law incorporated into the values of the citizens,
firms through the leadership of the more intelligent and more virtuous who
articulate its demands into reasoned form for the affirmation of the generality
of society.
As a closely reasoned statement of the specific function of natural law thinking in the good society, clearly distinguished from theological roots on one hand,
and legal expression in positive law and judicial decision on the other, this
essay is one of the best available today to the general student.
Robert M. Hutchins, in his "Natural Law and Jurisprudence," stresses the
actual universal ends of human nature: self-preservation, self-perfection, selfpropagation, and social fellowship. Natural law is essentially a commitment to
purpose and to reason as the instrumentality through which ends and means are
discovered. Acknowledging both the revolutionary technological change of the
world and man's freedom to reason about his own situation, he advances as supported by natural law doctrine such propositions, among others, as the necessity
of world government, the greater role of government in economic life through
maintenance of full employment, progressive income taxes, support of small
businesses and small farmers, and many other programs sought by contemporary
liberals. Contrary to some other participants in the discussion, Hutchins holds
that natural law sanctions divorce and birth control. When he maintains, "There
are confusions, contradictions, and inadequacies in natural law doctrine itself,"
he implies, of course, that not all "reasoning back to nature" is correct and
that such reasoning is open to modification as situations change.
The Buchanan, Wheeler, and Selznick essays are especially stimulating in
their accounts of how natural law "naturally" emerges from the human condition. Demanding very close attention in its comprehensive judgments about
historical periods and their predominant philosophies, Scott Buchanan's paper,
"Natural Law and Teleology," presents a history of natural law as an account
of man's grappling with crises that totally threaten his existence. Today's crisis,
he believes, is that of succumbing to a demonic control, independent of human
purpose, inherent in a highly technological system whose obsessive evil has been
described in La Technique by Jacques Ellul. Our situation is analogous to Plato's
facing the problem of introducing order among the arts, considered as a system
of power asking for efficient use, through a dialectic moving upward from the
empirical to the rational. Socrates, he notes, was accused by a poet and a
politician and two representatives of the Athenian arts.
If we do not recognize finality in nature and see it one with human purpose,
Buchanan feels natural law becomes a "mere humanism" unable to penetrate
the equations and mechanisms of natural and social science. The solution to
our contemporary crisis of technology and scientific knowledge and their imperviousness to moral values lies, he thinks, in a reconstitution of Kant's
categorical imperative. Buchanan sees the ideal of purpose in the universe as
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an ideal of reason which issues an imperative to the biologist, for example, to
conceive an organism as a system of reciprocal means and ends, and then trace
the instrumental relations in the mechanism of reciprocal efficient causes. In
jurisprudence, similarly, legislative enactment must have reasoned preambles,
and judicial decisions must be reasonable opinions. Natural law, as internal
teacher of judges, lawyers, citizens, is a "book of rules for the making, administration, and adjudication of positive laws." (p. 136) Kant's kingdom of ends
should then be extended to include all natural things. The exploitation of
natural resources, of which we have a long, unhappy experience, would be recognized as not "true" mining or "true" farming. The same reasoning should
apply to national economies and the world community as teleological fields
where all agents must be seen as reciprocally interacting as ends and means.
If Buchanan had given more attention to the teleology of human groups, such
as considered by Wheeler and Selznick, for which greater self-awareness and
reflective evaluation of common purposes have become increasingly feasible, he
might have been saved from confusing the levels of discourse of scientific
knowledge and human action. Those responsible for the values of emerging
society, and the legal structures through which they can be preserved, have more
to gain from the vitality of the social sciences and their practical extension into
the new fields of economic development and public administration than from
this construct of a Kantian-Aristotelian kingdom of ends.
Philip Selznick's "Natural Law and Sociology," which appeared in the 1961
NATURAL LAW FORUM, sees the study of normative systems as a way of discovering
latent values in the world of fact. Normative systems would include, beyond
the more familiar organization for survival, such living realities as friendship,
public opinion, fatherhood, and democracy, in which norms for full functioning
could be derived from detached observation of how new circumstances alter the
relation of the system with the master ideal. The moral relativism which
characterizes social sciences, moreover, facilitates a psychological "openness,"
a reverence for man in his cultural diversity, and the insight to define psychic
health and well-being of human nature. In society's quest for legality, understood
as the way rules are made and creatively applied by the judiciary, social science
also has much to contribute. Tradition not being ignored, "judicial conclusions
gain in legal authority as they are based on good reasoning, including sound
knowledge of human personality, human groups, human institutions." (p. 175)
If the central task of jurisprudence is the reduction of arbitrariness, legal norms
or principles become "natural law" to the extent they are based on scientific
generalizations grounded in warranted assertions about the human condition.
Harvey Wheeler's "Natural Law and Human Culture" conceives natural law
as a relationship that ought to exist in a culture if men are to provide themselves with the greatest welfare. It comes to exist as an anthropomorphic
projection into the universe of the regularities of one's own civilization. For
the Greeks, "It was an order of obligation and morality administered by God
in the same way that the early order of obligation and morality was administered
by the priest-king-paterfamilias." (p. 215) Then, as visible "in the heavens,"
natural law could be recognized as such and counterprojected back, as ideal-
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typical norms, to the institutions of earth from which it had been derived.
Aristotle's notion of a final cause was the last step in the rationalization of the
natural law.
More generally, the growth of culture initially brings the production of natural
law as the mythic projection of behavioral norms; then, in a way analogous
to the passage from astrology to astronomy, natural law becomes demythologized
and recognized as the policy recommendations of a developing political science.
At first self-validating, because it simply mirrors functioning cultural institutions,
the "higher law" is later seen in its long-run, general, collective implications and
is accepted only because it is a logically necessary efficient cause for a given
final cause. Wheeler illustrates his thesis by the growth of common law, the
rule of law, and constitutional theory in England. He stresses, nonetheless, the
reforming capability of natural law: "It is not merely deriving the prescriptive
implications of going institutions that provides sound social science projections,
but rather deriving the prescriptive implications of the most rational possible
institutions." (p. 237)
While aware as any of the other writers in this book of the independence of
any natural law activity from a specific philosophic or religious interpretation
of the universe, Rabbi Robert Gordis, in "Natural Law and Religion," points
out that the conservative bias found in the history of the concept can be attributed to its origin in Greco-Roman thought which saw life as an unchanging
and human history going through repetitive cycles. If natural law thinking
does have implications for the understanding of the ultimate nature of the
universe and if we do not limit arbitrarily the scope of human inquiry, the
Judeo-Christian source for natural law should not be ignored. Its claim to our
attention rests especially on the biblical view of the unity of the moral and
the natural in their divine origin and the revelation of the radical historicity
of the human condition. Both aspects would contribute greatly toward understanding contemporary natural law problems in a period of accelerated social
adaptation. Advocating the same reverence for a comprehensive kingdom of
ends as Buchanan, Gordis urges a religious framework of all elements of nature.
"The recognition has been growing," he holds, "that man has duties to his
'little brothers,' the animals, and even to his more distant cousins, the trees and
flowers, as well as to the mineral resources and the earth itself, which is his
mother. But the conservation of natural resources is more than good husbandry,
or, to use the term in its etymological sense, good economics." (p. 266)
Natural law inquiry and reflection may thrive better under such a horizon
rather than another or none at all. All that Gordis requests is that those unwilling
to go beyond the pragmatic values of a natural law jurisprudence to some
metaphysical justification would not deny its possibility. Indeed, one of the
chief merits of this set of essays is their nondoctrinaire approach, permitting
a real complementarity of viewpoint that affords the general reader a deeper
understanding of varied approaches and possibilities of natural law.
K.
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NICHOLAS OF CUSA AND MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT.

This very able analysis of the political writings of Nicholas of Cusa fills a
chapter in the history of late medieval thought that has long been desired.
Whereas previous treatments of the fifteenth century Cardinal's political theories
have been fragmentary and concentrated on his ideas of consent and representation almost exclusively in terms of his first great work, the De Concordantia
Catholica, Professor Sigmund has widened the spectrum of interpretation by
including Cusa's more mature works, notably the De Docta Ignorantia, the
De Auctoritate Presidendi Concilio Generali, and the De Pace Fidei. The quality

of research is evident on every page, and the author exhibits a fine knowledge
of current work that is being done by continental scholars.
Delineating the sources of Cusa's thought against the background of NeoPlatonic Christianity and his "legal antecedents," the author constructs a
penetrating appraisal of the influence of John of Paris, William of Occam, and
Marsilius of Padua. He also notes the parallel between Cusa and Gerson in
their rejection of a canonistic notion of the Church and their dependence upon
Augustine and the Victorines. In so doing he deftly avoids depreciating the
originality of Cusa by exposing him to a charge of eclecticism. Chapters five to
nine are an illuminating study of the Cardinal's underlying theme, a renovatio
of the Empire and the Church in terms of a better coordinated relationship
between the sacerdotium and the imperium. Hierarchical and functional interdependence are articulated in explaining Cusa's concept of the ecclesia in the
hierarchical and triadic order of the universe. In the Neo-Platonic tradition
the political and social system is linked with a grander scheme which unites all
created things with their Creator in a series of ascending values. For Cusa there
is a double hierarchy in the Church: sacramental, based upon the power of
orders and culminating in the episcopacy; and governmental or administrative,
of which the pope is the supreme example.
The work is especially enhanced by the author's presentation of Cusa within
the complicated background of the fifteenth century ecclesiastical history. His
work at the Council of Basel, his reformatory efforts as papal legate in the Empire
and his attempts to reform the diocese of Brixen are given a lively treatment.
At times the author seems at pains to reconcile Cusa's earlier conciliarism with
his return to the papal camp after Basel. Perhaps Cusa emerges as the classic
example of a failure to bridge the gulf between the extreme hierocrats who
confused logic with reasonableness and the defenders of the lay thesis who denied
all papal authority except the plenitudo potestatis.

As is inevitable in works of this nature, there are a few matters of historical
fact that may be questionable. Whether Cusa was the first to expose the historical
falsity of the well-known skeleton in the ecclesiastical closet, the Donation of
Constantine, might be doubted. Lupold of Babenberg by appealing to historical
sources seems to have reached the same conclusion in the previous century. The
contemporary bishop of Chichester, Reginald Pecock, in contrast to the uncertain
vacillation of Cusa is far more exact in his historical investigation and certainly
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more conclusive in his rejection of it. The Council of Basel was opened by the
Dominican John of Ragusa and John of Palomar in July of 1431. It is
curious that the author refers to the decree Haec Sancta of Constance as the
Sacrosancta since the later designation was not used until the Council of Basel
and then only for the first time in the decree of May 16, 1439. Previous to that,
in 1432 and again in 1434, it used the original title, Haec Sancta.
Not only students of political science, but historians, theologians, and all
who are seriously interested in ecumenism will welcome this excellent work.
The bibliography is the most comprehensive of any work on this subject in English.
JOHN
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REVOLUTION IN THE METHODOLOGY

HISTORY. By Julian Franklin. New York: Columbia Uni-

versity Press, 1963. Pp. 160. $4.00.
This book is about the contributions of Jean Bodin, sixteenth century French
political writer and jurist, to the methodology of law and history. The author,
associate professor of political science at Columbia, sums up as follows:
My essential point, from the perspective of the history of method, is that the
methodological thinking of the eighteenth century, on which the present is
itself dependent, is the fruit of a continuous tradition which arises in the
later sixteenth century. (p. 154)
I do not find the case convincing. I shall suggest in a moment that the chief
difficulty with this study is that it is at once too narrow and too broad. But
beyond this I find two shortcomings. The first and more important is that
Franklin does not seem to have a very clear idea of contemporary methodology
in law and history. I should have thought it widely agreed that the process of
discovery itself, whether it be of discovery of new evidence or of a new synthesis
of available data, may not have, indeed usually does not have, a logical structure.
In any case it lacks the formal structure of the presentation that is made to
explain and defend a claim of discovery. Franklin seems confused at this starting
point and never so far as I can see makes it clear whether he is talking about,
on the one hand, how Bodin came to his views about law and history, or, on
the other hand, how Bodin undertook to justify those views.
A second and related shortcoming is the poverty of Franklin's own argument.
He seems to have read most of what he should have read concerning his immediate subject, though I do not know enough to express an opinion in this respect.
But the analysis of the material and the development of the subject is a tepid
mush of loose propositions qualified into unintelligibility. Franklin makes use
of adverbs such as "especially" (e.g., pp. 26, 59, 78, 86), "generally" (e.g., pp. 9,
10, 11, 17, 18, 30, 32, 84, 85, 86), "explicitly" (e.g., pp. 17, 31, 85, 87), and "relatively" (e.g., pp. 11, 13, 26) to help himself through passages that might otherwise
be subject to interpretation. I so lost my sense of direction in Franklin's quag-
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mire of unstatements that I could not state just what his point about Bodin
is or why he believes it valid. This may not be Franklin's fault, but rather the
product of cautionary emendations inserted by a tremulous editorial committee.
In any case, the resulting exposition is hard to follow.
Some comment is appropriate on the problem to which Franklin's book is
addressed. In its broadest statement, the problem is how and what man knows
of himself and of the (apparitional?) world about him. From the time the
thought first occurred that there might be more to it all than what lies before
the eyes, this problem has excited man's attention and disturbed his peace of
mind. It was and is a problem with which he who would speak or think about
matters of consequence must come to some sort of terms. Surely this is true at
least for the historian and the jurist. For unless there is some accepted answer,
however provisional, to the elementary epistemological and ethical questions
posed by present experience, it is difficult to see how one can proceed to consider
past experience (history) or the more complex normative issues generated by
reflection on experience (law).
Now in order to write a fragment of history or of law it is neither desirable
nor possible to rehearse in detail the abiding issues of philosophy. The working
historian or jurist need not have Plato, St. Thomas, and Hume for breakfast
every day. I do not see how he can do his job very well if he has not at some
stage thought seriously and carefully about philosophy's great questions. Having
done so, however, he can go through the pick and shovel work of locating,
assembling, and evaluating the relevant primary data without formal methodological refreshers. And so if one were to undertake to do a pick and shovel job
on the history of a particular subject at a particular period, as Franklin has
not attempted to do, it would be in order to shortcut all the fancy stuff and
just lay out what you've got. But this is only because one can count on a sturdy
foundation of presuppositions to support the exposition as it progresses. We and
our correspondents are men of a time, a place, a language and a culture, and
we all know it. In ordinary discourse we can pass by semantic, analytical, and
evidentiary difficulties, knowing that our passing has been noticed and understood as an omission in the interest of expediency.
There are occasions, however, when the presuppositions of ordinary discourse
may not be indulged. Such is the case in discourse with foreigners, as travelers
abroad and treaty negotiators well know. In those circumstances it is not possible
to count on shared experience and shared values to complete the ellipsis of
normal conversation, and special care must be taken to say what is meant and
to see whether what is said is understood as intended. Those who do well at
talking with foreigners though they be no philosophers know a great deal of
themselves and of the world.
A similar occasion is presented in undertaking to examine the presuppositions
of a culture such as ours of the modern West. In such an examination that
which is ordinarily presupposed in inquiry is itself made the object of inquiry.
The presuppositions of a culture cannot be used to explain themselves; if they
are to be explained, it must be by use of terms and by stages that are semantically, analytically, and evidentially more precise and circumspect than those
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of ordinary discourse. I trust that it takes no argument to carry the suggestion
that an inquiry concerning "the theory of history" (p. 1), "the logical basis of
historical belief" (p. 7), and the "history of method" (p. 154) is an examination
of important presuppositions. One would expect that such an inquiry would
display an appreciation of the traditional problems of philosophy.
To the traditional problems of philosophy there have been essentially two
approaches, epitomized as those of the hedgehog and those of the fox.' The
hedgehog would know the world by seeing it through the lattice of a great
organizing concept. His range is wide, his strokes broad, his sighting telescopic.
The fox would know the world by studying his own back yard. His range is short,
his strokes pointillist, his sighting microscopic. Both methods have their uses, and
both have their limitations. The most serious limitation of large-scale inquiry
is imprecision, the most serious limitation of small-scale inquiry is insignificance.
But surely it would be incongruous to undertake a small-scale inquiry with largescale methods, and thus to encounter both limitations.
Yet I fear that this is what Franklin has done. The scale of the stated
inquiry is heroic: How many questions are there that are broader than "the
history of method"? Yet the response turns out to be the gleanings from the
work of a demipersonage appearing midway in the two-millennial epoch known
as Western civilization. I come away with the impression of having read Toynbee
in the Reader's Digest.
The problem of scale which I think has presented insurmountable difficulties
for Franklin's book is widely encountered in contemporary letters and science.
It is the technical aspect of what is called overspecialization. "Overspecialization"
is the condition of a specialist who wishes he were a generalist. The reason why
he is a specialist is that the marketplace, commercial and academic, says it
wants specialists, or at any rate people who have a specialist M.O.S. whatever
else they may be. He wishes to be a generalist because the general problemswar, famine, hatred, stupidity, and the downtown parking situation- are the
ones that worry him and that command his respect as a mind. As a specialist,
he is afraid for very good reasons to publish anything unless it is either documented so exhaustively or stated so elusively as to be unassailable. As a thoughtful
human being, he wants to take aim at the big questions and try to say something
useful about them. In doing so, he may be (as I think Franklin may have been)
half bold, and that is fatal. Perhaps he raises his glass to the heavens and suddenly discovers that the only technique he has mastered is microscopy. In any
case, it is a humiliating experience and one painful to observe.
I should like to mention another dimension of the topic which Franklin
undertook to discuss. This is the problem of the emergence of scientific method
as the accepted mode of description and verification of palpable phenomena in
Western culture. The generally shared notion of how this occurred is that the
scientific method gradually superseded the method of authority represented by
the Church by undermining the bases of religious belief. The gradients in the
path of supersession were the degree of religious skepticism and the decline in
the secular power of the Roman Church. From a Church ascendant in an
1.
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ignorant world of the Dark Ages to a Church quiescent in an intelligent,
knowledgeable modem world, this is the upward march.
There is, it seems to me, a complementary view, one that no doubt has found
expression elsewhere. This is that the Church was not, or at least not simply,
an obstacle which science had to overcome, but the foundation on which science
was built. I would suggest that there are at least two cornerstones in that
foundation, one a matter of faith and the other more mundane. As to the matter
of faith, the Church held out that men, at least men who acknowledged Christ,
were equally the children of God whatever their earthly condition or estate. We
need not pause over the question, still a puzzling one, "Equal in what respects?"
To assert that men were equal in any important respects was revolutionary doctrine, doctrine that no other major social institution had ever before propounded.
The notion that men are equal it seems to me is the crucial first step in establishing a scientific method of proof. If men are equal in "reason" (to use the oldfashioned term meaning general "perceptive-cognitive-reflective capacity"), then
a method of description and verification must be developed that by its terms
does not depend on differences in estate or official capacity among those who
would describe and verify. This requirement is met only by a system of "objective proof," i.e., proofs intelligible to any human observer and not a special
class of, e.g., priests or seers. At bottom this is what modem science, including
modem historiography, is all about.
I do not suggest that the theme of the Church as the Father of Science can
be read unambiguously between the lines of Church history. Like most fathers,
the Church was often confused, often at cross-purposes and often wrong in
respect to its progeny, and its record in regard to science is surely an ambivalent
one. What I am suggesting is that the record is indeed ambivalent and that
the elemental values which the Church was furthering included not only the
spiritual and secular ascendancy of the Holy See but also the dignity and
autonomy of the individual person. It was in the conflict between these values
that scientific method emerged. At least a hedgehog might undertake to put
it in that perspective.
The other cornerstone also relates to the role of the Church. This is the
decision taken at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 to proscribe the ordeal
as an authorized method of trial. It is recognized that this decision had major
effects on trial procedure in England, 2 and it is difficult to believe that it did
not have similar effects elsewhere, for if trial by ordeal was not widespread it
would be hard to understand why it would warrant an ecumenical decree.
It seems to me quite possible that this decision played a major role in the
development of scientific method in the late medieval and early Renaissance
period. If divine intervention was to be supplanted by evidential proofs of
some sort in judicial inquiries, would it not soon come to mind that this kind
of proof should be required in other types of inquiry? Could it not be that
some of the impetus to rational generalization in science, including the science
of history, came from the processes of rational particularization that from 1215
2. See,
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onward the civil courts were increasingly compelled to observe? Such a development, of course, would have to be traced in the light of the Church's already
established rules of evidence in its own courts, where again emphasis was given
to observable evidence. In the end there may be no evidence to support the conjecture I have tendered here. Still, it would pique not only the sense of history
but the sense of irony as well if it should appear that the Lateran Council,
chiefly concerned with the doctrinal and secular supremacy of the Church
organization, lit the spark that by and by enkindled the minds of Newton and
Descartes. At least it would be a challenge to the historical foxes.
GEOFFREY
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THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT. By Ch. Perelman. Trans-

lated from the French by John Petrie. With an Introduction by H. L. A.
Hart. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities
Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 212. $5.50.
This book is a happy exception to the usual rule that when an author brings
together several of his separate essays the outcome is a work that lacks any internal principles of either pattern or development. This volume does share some of
the unfortunate characteristics of most collections: there is a certain amount of
repetitiveness; there are lacunae that one would like to see bridged; there are
suggestions that never get fulfilled. But in the present case these faults are largely
transmuted into virtues. The manner in which this occurs is quite simple: we
here see a mind in action, exploring certain phenomenal fields, grappling with
problems that its own inquiries expose, moving from position to position, and
accumulating its results without positing any final conclusions. In short, we are
apparently confronted with a case where the order of presentation reflects the
order of discovery. This deprives us of the advantage we usually enjoy of being
able to anticipate an argument and its outcome. But it affords us the much
greater privilege of watching issues as they emerge, deliberations as they take
place, and solutions as they are given shape.
The two themes woven into all of these essays, binding them together, are
those of "justice" and "argument." Of these, justice constitutes the central subject matter, from which arise the problems that are the author's primary concern.
The theory of argument is then developed in order to afford a more satisfactory
way of dealing with these problems than is permitted by contemporary notions of
formal logic and scientific methodology. The chronology of these essays certainly
seems to support such an interpretation. The longest and most substantial of
these pieces, "Concerning Justice," is also much the earliest, dating from 1945,
and is placed first in this volume. It is devoted to a rigorous analysis of the concept of justice, and reaches two general conclusions: first, that insofar as justice
is a rational idea it is also quite formal and empty, requiring only "fidelity to
rule, obedience to a system" (p. 41) ; second, that the contents of these rules, and
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hence the values they seek to promote, are altogether arbitrary and incapable of
justification. The rest of the essays are dated considerably later, ranging from
1954 to 1960: they all seek to complement this abstract doctrine by indicating
how our judgments of value - of concrete justice - can escape arbitrariness
and be rendered reasonable, so as to be at least supported and purified, if not
completely guaranteed. With this brief glance at the pattern of the work, we can
now follow more carefully the movement of thought through its several parts.
I
In introducing his analysis of justice, Perelman stresses two prominent
features of this concept: it carries a heavy emotional charge, and it is interpreted
in radically different and conflicting ways. Whenever the idea of justice is invoked, it is appealed to as a supreme and self-sustaining value that everyone
must immediately acknowledge. But the actions and states-of-affairs that are
recommended under the aegis of this idea exhibit great variation. That is, the
term has a plurality of meanings, and six of these are here singled out for special
consideration: some hold that all persons should be treated in exactly the same
way, independently of any qualifying traits; others hold variously that persons
should be treated according to their merits, their works, their needs, their rank,
or their legal entitlement.
Given the presence and active influence of these irreconcilable formulas of
justice, three possible standpoints can be adopted. "The first would consist in
declaring that these differing conceptions of justice have absolutely nothing in
common .

.

. and these meanings are not united by any conceptual link." (p. 10)

This is tantamount to saying that further discussion of justice, on either the
theoretical or the practical plane, is fruitless: the word is a mere euphemism
under which we seek to disguise our personal prejudices and preferences; and
the sooner we eliminate the concept, which is as emotionally full as it is rationally empty, the better will be our chances of discussing our differences more
calmly and clearly. A second standpoint would be to choose one of these formulas and insist that it alone yields the true meaning of justice. But since
different people will certainly give their allegiance to different formulas, this
can only lead to conflict that will be the more bitter because no party will admit
the possibility of a further appeal. There remains one further alternative: that
of "seeking out what there is in common between these various conceptions of
justice." (p. 11) This standpoint assumes, and seeks to identify, a single generic
meaning of justice of which the competing and more concrete conceptions are so
many specifications.
Perelman, in adopting this approach, makes it clear that he is aware of the
task it imposes. He puts it in these terms:
The question is to find a formula of justice which is common to the
different conceptions we have analyzed. This formula must contain an
indeterminate element - what in mathematics is called a variable - the determination of which will give now one, now another, conception of justice.
The common idea will constitute a definition of formal or abstract justice.
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Each particular or concrete formula of justice will constitute one of the
innumerable values of formal justice. (p. 15)
The next step in the argument is to define formal justice. This is done by reference to the concept of equality: justice demands that equals be treated equally.
This identification is in turn supported by a twin appeal to common sense and
the history of moral and legal opinion. Both of these, the author holds, agree
that justice is intimately associated with a proper application of the notions of
equality and proportionality; and he propounds his definition of formal justice
in these terms:
Whatever, then, their disagreement on other points, they are all agreed
that to be just is to give the same treatment to those who are equal from
some particular point of view, who possess one characteristic, and the
only one to which regard must be had in the administration of justice.
Let us qualify this characteristic as essential. . . . We can, then, define
formal or abstract justice as a principle of action in accordance with which
beings of one and the same essential category must be treated in the same
way. (p 16)
This manner of distinguishing and delineating formal and concrete justice
yields great immediate advantages. It gives us a precise conception of abstract
justice, devoid of emotional charge. It enables us to deal separately and calmly
with the complex procedural and administrative problems that are involved in
the effort to establish a system that will guarantee formal justice. And it marks
out, for independent treatment, the difficulties that arise from the relation of
formal and concrete justice.
But Perelman is emphatic in pointing out that this interpretation of justice
also has stringent limitations. There are two of these that are particularly important: in the first place, this formal definition, since it leaves the issue of concrete
justice quite untouched, "tells us neither when two beings participate in an essential category nor how they ought to be treated" (p. 16) ; in the second place, the
justice that would be meted out by the strict application of this formula would
be absolutely rigid and impersonal, permitting no qualifications or exceptions.
In short, this approach leaves us with a notion of justice that is devoid of content
and incapable of accommodation. These are serious deficiencies, and Perelman
devotes a large part of his principal essay to a consideration of the means by
which, and the degree to which, they can be made good in the actual administration of justice.
As regards the measures we adopt to mitigate the strict rule of formal justice,
these are largely embodied in the doctrines and procedures of equity. Life is
neither as simple nor as categorical as this rule implies, and as its application
would require. The actual situations with which law has to deal are complex and
fluid: they expose several facets, all of which assert themselves as equally essential but each of which demands its own distinctive and different manner of
treatment. Any strict solution of such a case would at once satisfy and flout
the requirements of formal justice, depending upon the specific characteristic
that one selects as essential. To avoid such outcomes, we modify and compromise
the competing demands, allowing some weight to each: that is, we qualify the
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general and abstract rule as we apply it to particular and concrete cases. Equity
is the technique by which we accomplish this transformation: equity seeks to
combine the individual appropriateness of justice at the palace gate with the
stability and certainty of justice in the court of law.
Equity is essentially a pragmatic and procedural device, trying to temper
injustice in practice but without really coming to grips with the problem of
justice in theory: as the author puts it, "equity is the crutch of justice." If we
want a cure and not merely a corrective, we must cut deeper than this, moving
from the level of formal justice to that of concrete justice. Formal justice tells
us that we must adhere to certain stated rules. But it does not tell us how to determine which rules are themselves just or unjust: that is, it does not afford us any
hold on the content of justice. So the critical question that is now posed is this:
How can we decide among varying formulas of concrete justice, and identify the
true content of the just rule? Or, stated differently, how can we move from
procedural to substantive justice?
The final sections of the essay "Concerning Justice" deal with this question
at length. The treatment is based on an analysis that distinguishes three elements
in justice: "the value that is its foundation, the rule that sets it out, the act that
gives it effect." (p. 56) The two latter elements fall under the purview of formal
justice, and so are subject to the requirements of reason: given a set of values,
we can establish a system of rules that will express these values; and given this
system of rules, we can define acts that are in accord with them. But it is quite
otherwise with the values that ground this whole structure and give content to
the rules of concrete justice. As Perelman saw the matter at the time of this
essay, value judgments are sheerly emotional and preferential; they have no logical or empirical basis. Once we have accepted certain concrete values - certain
goals and norms - then we can state absolutely that formal justice demands
that the rules that derive from and support these values should be applied with
coherence and regularity: these latter two are, so to speak, intrinsic values of
justice as such. But the ultimate moral and social values on which these depend
cannot themselves be rationally justified, or "proved." The selection of these
values is the result of a decision, not a deduction or an inference: they are objects
of choice and commitment rather than demonstration and proof. In sum, values
are personal and relative. And Perelman sums up the conclusions of this phase
of his inquiry in these words:
As for the value that is the foundation of the normative system, we cannot
subject it to any rational criterion: it is utterly arbitrary and logically
indeterminate ....
The idea of value is, in effect, incompatible both with
formal necessity and with experiential universality. There is no value
which is not logically arbitrary. (pp. 56-57)
II
The preceding analysis of justice is extremely illuminating and fruitful when
looked at from a strictly legal point of view. The distinction of formal and concrete justice permits us to mark off those problems with which the admin-
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istration of law is properly concerned, and so to avoid the distorting intrusion
into these problems of extraneous moral and political considerations. But the conclusions to which this analysis leads are quite unsatisfactory when looked at from
a larger human and social point of view. For the formula of abstract justice tells
us nothing at all as to how we should divide men into essentially different groups,
or classes, nor as to the ways in which we should treat those different groups. This
formula is devoid of material content: it leaves altogether indeterminate the ends
to be sought and the conditions to be promoted by the rule of justice. Such a conception, however relevant in some respects, is obviously incomplete: it cannot be
made operative until its abstract form has been filled in with a concrete content;
that is, there must be a determination of the goals that formal justice should
realize, the purposes it should further, the norms it should impose, and the values
it should support.
Perelman is perfectly aware of this problem, and the rest of the essays in the
volume are all explorations toward its solution. There are evidently two general
ways in which one can try to deal with this problem. One of these would consist
in supplying a definite content to the concept of justice. This would entail, at the
most basic level, the projection of "an ideal vision of man and society": from this
there could then be derived more precise values and norms; these in turn would
determine the modes of behavior and the manners of treatment that men are
required to observe; and these could be formulated in exact rules. This would
constitute a substantive approach to the problem of concrete justice, and it is
essentially moral and political in character: it defines the just person, the just
act, and the just rule by reference to an idealized conception of man and society.
Furthermore, it is obvious that some such "solution" to the problem of justice
stands at the basis of every society: it is embodied in tradition, and it guarantees
the stability and continuity of the social order. The controlling factor in this
process is what Perelman calls the "principle of inertia": the tendency of men to
regard as right and proper - that is, as "just" - whatever is already established
or is in conformity with precedent. Perelman is aware of the extreme importance
of this notion of justice in any actual society. But he is equally aware of its
shortcomings, which he epitomizes by referring to it as "static justice": it perpetuates the status quo, and has no provision for accommodating changes in
either society's actual circumstances or man's ideal aspirations.
Such a substantive concept of justice, then, is always present, and is not so
much a problem as a given; or, more exactly, it is a given and it poses a problem.
Static justice serves as the continuing fabric of society, and it continually challenges us to refine and improve it. This challenge constitutes the problem of
dynamic justice. And the kind of solution that it demands is not substantive, but
methodological. This challenge, since its terms are always changing, does not
permit of any final and definitive solution; rather, it requires that we develop a
technique for dealing with the novel issues to which it ever gives rise. That is,
there is no abstract and formal solution to the problem of dynamic justice; the
best that we can look for here is a way of settling the endless stream of concrete
and material problems with which it confronts us. In this context, it is a method
to which we must commit ourselves, not a set of answers.
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It is this aspect of the problematic of justice in which Perelman is primarily
interested. His mature deliberations and conclusions on this subject have been
presented in a book of major importance;' most of the essays in the present
volume are either preliminary explorations leading toward that work or later
developments of some of its themes. The broad argument that binds all of these
efforts together can be summarized in a series of propositions: The concept of
concrete justice depends upon the concept of value; the content of the rules of
justice can be determined only by reference to explicit ideals, goals, and norms.
But presently entrenched interpretations and criteria of validity and truth - of
inductive and deductive procedures, of analytic and synthetic propositions, of
postulation and verification - put values beyond the reach of sound logical inquiry: it is held that values cannot be known and established by either rational
or empirical methods. Consequently, the values that ground justice are themselves unjustifiable: they can only be asserted arbitrarily. And, finally, the
concrete rules of justice are vitiated by this same groundlessness: their content is
determined more by tradition and force than by reason and evidence. If this conclusion is to be avoided, and its consequences averted, it is necessary to find "a
way of reasoning about values." (p. 57)
The present essays do no more than adumbrate some of the salient features of
such reasoning, the full analysis of which is contained in the work referred to
above; but their significance is nevertheless great, for they deal in an extremely
lucid manner with issues that are basic to our culture. Perelman attacks the problem of "reasoning about values" on two levels: he first indicates the assumptions
that are advanced to invalidate such reasoning; he then argues that these assumptions are themselves invalid.
The gist of the first phase of this discussion is the insistence that the current
conception of logical techniques - of what constitutes valid inquiry - is entirely too narrow, rigid, and arbitrary. This conception is summarized in the doctrine
that "only that which conforms to scientific method is rational." (p. 135) And
the theory of scientific method is itself based on the still more primitive axiom
of "self-evidence." So it is this latter notion that must be closely examined and
corrected. The author points out that both rationalism and empiricism, drawing
their inspirations from Descartes and Locke, alike take the notion of self-evidence
as basic. They differ in their identifications both of self-evident elements, and of
the methods of drawing further conclusions from these: the rationalists start
with clear and distinct ideas of certain general and fundamental characteristics
of reality, and they infer from these deductively; the empiricists start with simple
ideas of primary qualities, and infer from these inductively. But both schools
agree that inquiry must take its departure from truths that are certain, complete,
and unchanging. Perelman argues cogently that these criteria can never in fact
be satisfied: they are dogmatic, artificial, and unhistorical. Furthermore, this
doctrine has the disastrous effect of putting stringent limitations on the idea of
1. Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tytega, Traiti de l'argumentation. La nouvelle rhetorique
(Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958). Reviewed in 7 NATURAL LAW FORUM 199
(1962).
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reason: it confronts us with a crude alternative "beween complete scepticism and
knowledge founded on infallible self-evidence." (p. 115)
The corrective to this situation is a radical transformation of our conceptions
inquiry," and other related notions. Perelman moves toward
of "truth," "reason, ....
this goal along several paths. One of these consists in a return to Aristotle's
distinction between analytical and dialectical proofs, or demonstration and argumentation. With regard to many matters, and notably in the human context, we
cannot demonstrate 'analytically because we lack both clearly defined primitive
terms and universally accepted premises. So we can only argue dialectically:
our principles must be provisional, we have to persuade our audience to accept
and test them, and they are gradually established by their outcomes. Argument,
then, is neither certain nor arbitrary: it is relatively probable, convincing, and
fruitful.
A second path toward epistemological reform is guided by an insistence on the
historical and social character of inquiry and knowledge. It is the teaching of
Descartes and Locke that our "self-evident" ideas come to us by direct contact
with their objects, undistorted by personal idiosyncrasies or traditional prejudices.
But this is absurd. The use of reason is an apprenticeship that continues through
both individual lives and successive generations. And the knowledge that it
yields is not a series of additions, but rather a synthetic whole that changes as
it grows.

The most interesting path Perelman explores - especially from the perspective
of law and justice - is traced by the notion of precedent. What Perelman does
here is draw a parallel between "the rule of justice and the basis of induction"
in the sciences: he argues that the general principle governing both of these procedures is that of "treating like cases alike." In law, every decision establishes
a presumption that similar cases will be similarly decided in the future; in empirical inquiry, every phenomenon is treated as "the manifestation of an implicit
rule according to which essentially similar phenomena manifest the same properties." (p. 83) Both in dispensing justice under law and in carrying on scientific
investigations, two things are prerequisite: an established framework that guarantees the stability, coherence, and continuity of our interpretations; and a method
for continually extending and refining this framework so that it can satisfactorily
accommodate the new instances that we encounter and must bring under it. In
the case of justice these are supplied, speaking roughly, by a constitution and by
principles of judicial procedure - by "due process of law" in a broad sense of
that term. In the case of science they are supplied, again speaking roughly, by
the primitive concepts and postulates of a theory and by the principles of logic
and methodology. Furthermore, and this point is of crucial importance, these
substantive and procedural foundations of justice and science are neither selfevident nor absolute. They are gradual accretions and they undergo continual
modification.
There thus turn out to be very close similarities between these apparently
quite different enterprises. Neither the quest of law for justice nor the quest of
science for truth can be expected to attain to - much less start from - any selfevident certainties. Law and science alike rest upon foundations both fallible and
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shifting; and the methods they employ, while carefully devised to minimize error,
cannot immunize us against it. Neither facts nor values can be absolutely guaranteed. But this does not mean that values, any more than facts, need be arbitrary or capricious. Rather, both facts and values, which embody our considered
opinions of the true and the good, represent tentative but testable probabilities.
Working within this context and toward these conclusions, the high merit of
Perelman's analyses is twofold: first, he has mounted a cogent attack upon the
separation in principle of fact and value, truth and opinioh, rational proof and
arational arbitrariness; second, he has developed a method by which in practice
we can investigate problems concerning values, and so can give reasonable content to the rules of justice and morality.
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